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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS
John T. Baker*
INTRODUCTION
Poverty in the 1970's does not pose the same problem that ex-
isted ten years and twenty-two billions of dollars ago,1 nor does it
have the same significance as poverty had when racial segregation
prevailed. Yet, poverty persists practically undiminished and pro-
longs our formally repudiated history of racial segretation.
In analyzing the problems that poverty presents it would be
futile to complain of a lack of national commitment or to directly in-
dict the methods that have been used to eliminate poverty. Clearly
the delivery of financial, vocational and technical resources is essen-
tial in combatting poverty; just as obviously, the security, social
status and professional positions that would be required to eliminate
the distinction between historically advantaged and disadvantaged
people are becoming more scarce for everyone and harder to
deliver.
Appropriately enough, the major empirical basis for most anti-
poverty activities has been economic need. However, the reliance on
economic need combined with the possibility of success as the
criterion of governmental action, appears to be an inadequate
response to a poverty problem that has proved itself durable and
perhaps in some degree perpetual. It is now necessary to disregard
almost twenty years of concerted effort to view poverty as an
emergency situation that calls for departures from the principles
that are deferred to in other contexts. That is, emergency measures
which current economic technologies call for to combat poverty are
less important than the status which should be accorded poor people
in keeping with the democratic traditions of the country.
This Article will examine one specific federal anti-poverty pro-
gram, Subpart VII of the Community Services Act of 1974,' and sug-
gest ways in which it can be used to bring past experience to bear on
the problem of poverty in the present. That is, the analysis will
*Professor of Law, Indiana University Law School. B.A. 1962, Fisk Universi-
ty; LL.B. 1965, Howard University.
1. See Washington Post, Dec. 8, 1977, at Fl.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2981-2985 (1976).
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show how currently unexploited possibilities in the statute provide
courses of action that are appropriate to a problem as impenetrable
as poverty has been.
A preliminary understanding of Subpart VII, its stated pur-
pose, history, and means of implementation is essential to the
anlaysis. Congress' intent was to:
[E]ncourage the development of special programs by
which the residents of urban and rural low-income areas
may, through self-help and mobilization of the community
at large, with appropriate Federal assistance, improve the
quality of their economic and social participation in com-
munity life in such a way as to contribute to the elimina-
tion of poverty and the establishment of permanent
economic and social benefits.'
This goal is to be implemented by Community Development Cor-
porations (hereafter CDCs). A CDC is legally defined as:
[A] non-profit organization responsible to residents of the
area it serves which is receiving financial assistance under
. . . this subchapter, and any organization, more than 50
per centum of which is owned by such an organization, or
otherwise controlled by such an organization, or
designated by such an organization for the purpose of this
subchapter.4
The origins of CDCs, however, predate Subpart VII. CDCs
were not created by Subpart VII; rather, they originated as a result
of efforts of leaders in low-income, predominantly black communities
to create institutions through which residents of low-income com-
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2981 (1976).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2981 (a) (Supp 1978). Considerable confusion attaches to the
term Community Development Corporation, which has been employed by and used to
refer to various enterprises operating as for-profit or non-profit corporations in urban
and rural underdeveloped areas throughout the country. See, e.g., BLAUSTEN AND
FAUX, THE STAR-SPANGLED HUSTLE - WHITE POWER AND BLACK CAPITALISM 179-86
(1972); HAMDEN-TURNER, FROM POVERTY TO DIGNITY - A STRATEGY FOR POOR AMERICANS
139 (1974); Note, Community Development Corporations: Operations and Financing, 83
HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1560 (1970); FORD FOUNDATION, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COR-
PORATIONS - A STRATEGY FOR DEPRESSED URBAN AND RURAL AREAS 7 (Ford Foundation
Policy Paper, 1973); Sturdivant, Community Development Corporations: The Problem
of Mixed Objectives, 36 L, AND CONTEM. PROB. 35 (1971). As used in this article the
term identifies the corporations selected to obtain federal funds under Title VII of the
HEADSTART, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AND COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP ACT OF 1974, 42
U.S.C. § 2981 (1976).
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munities could exercise control over important social, political and
economic resources both within and beyond the boundaries of their
communities.' The federal government greatly accelerated the
5. See S. Perry, A Note on the Genesis of the Community Development Cor-
poration, in THE CASE FOR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, 56 (Benello and Roussopoulos
eds. 1971); M. Brower, The Emergence of Community Development Corporations in
Urban Neighborhoods, 41 AMER. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 646 (1971); TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY FUND TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS, CDCs: NEW HOPE
FOR THE INNER CITY 50-51 (Background paper by Geoffrey Faux, 1971) (hereinafter
Faux); C. H. TURNER, FROM POVERTY To DIGNITY 112-13 (1974). One of the most widely
known CDCs was, in fact, created prior to the enactment of Subpart VII. Progress
Enterprises is probably the oldest minority-owned CDC in the country. It was
established in 1962 by a black minister, Rev. Leon Sullivan. Its original capital came
from parishoners of Rev. Sullivan's church. Pursuant to Rev. Sullivan's 10-36 Plan, in-
dividuals contributed $10 per month for thirty-six months with the understanding that
the money would be used for community economic development. One of its first
business ventures was Progress Plaza, a shopping center located in North
Philadelphia. See Faux, supra note 5, at 65-68; Note, Community Development Cor-
porations: Operations and Financing, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1558, 1562-67 (1970).
In addition to Progress Enterprises, other CDCs were established without
assistance from the Federal Government. The Hough Development Corporation, like
Progress Enterprises, was created by a black minister, Rev. Brown, in Cleveland, Ohio
in 1968. In 1967 Brown called a meeting of most of the social and political leaders in
the Hough section of Cleveland and "proposed the creation of a coalition of black
residents and leaders to develop the community's own programs rather than depend-
ing solely on federal and city initiatives." The Hough Development Corporation was
formed in the spring of 1968 to carry out the mission proposed by Rev. Brown. The
initial members of the Board of Directors, mostly residents and people active in public
programs in Hough contributed to the corporation's initial capital of $2,000. See
Faux, supra note 5, at 67-71; Note Community Development Corporations: Operation
and Financing, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1558, 1571-73 (1970).
Action Industries, Inc., located in Venice, California (which is within the cor-
porate limits of the City of Los Angeles) was formed in 1968 by a group of local com-
munity leaders. Initial funding for the corporation's community economic development
programs came from the Commonwealth United Corporation, a diversified corporation
whose stock has been publicly traded on the American Stock Exchange. Action In-
dustries began its active phase by purchasing and operating several small businesses,
mainly in the merchandising or service area. Initially, the directors of Action In-
dustries were selected by Project Action, a community-based non-profit organization
whose membership was open to all residents of Venice. See Note, Community
Development Corporations: Operation and Financing, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1558, 1568-71
(1970). The FIGHT (Freedom, Independence, God, Honor, Today) organization was
formed in Rochester, New York in 1964. FIGHT's directors were chosen at an annual
convention by delegates from community organizations in Rochester. Initially, FIGHT
confronted the Kodak Corporation over the issue of minority hiring. This resulted in
some changes in that company's hiring practices as well as changes in other
businesses in Rochester. The struggle with Kodak led to the formation of the
Rochester Business Opportunities Corporation, a coalition of established Rochester
businesses, which facilitated the formation of over sixty minority businesses within a
three year period. One of FIGHT's major economic projects was an electronic subcon-
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growth of existing CDCs and the creation of new CDCs by providing
funds in exchange for some federal control over their activities.
Nevertheless, Subpart VII incorporates some of the objectives of
CDC founders by including social as well as economic goals' and by
providing that ownership of projects acquired with federal funds
will vest in CDCs upon termination of the program.7
Since the areas in which CDCs are located differ substantially
in size, population, and degree of deterioration, it is apparent that
Subpart VII needs the flexibility to allow for different strategies to
meet the potentially dissimilar problems of each area.8 Accordingly,
tracting plant, FIGHTON, which it established with the assistance of the Xerox Cor-
poration. Most of FIGHT's funds, during its initial operation, came from church con-
tributions and local fund-raising drives. See Fau, supra note 5, at 74-75.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2982a (4) (1976), provides that CDCs may use federal funds
for "social service programs which support and complement community economic
development programs ... including but not limited to child care, educational services,
health services, credit counseling, energy conservation, and programs for the
maintenance of housing facilities." Id.
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 2982c (1976). Currently, twenty-five urban CDCs receive
Subpart VII funds. These CDCs and their locations are: Anacostia Economic Develop-
ment Corporation, Washington, D.C.; Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation,
Brooklyn, New York; Black People's Unity Movement Economic Development Corpora-
tion, Camden, New Jersey; Chicanos Por La Causa, Phoenix, Arizona; Chinese
Economic Development, Boston, Mass.; Community Development Corporation of Kan-
sas City, Kansas City, Missouri; Denver Community Development Corporation,
Denver, Colorado; East Boston Community Development Corporation, Boston, Mass.;
The East Los Angeles Community Union, Los Angeles, Calif.; Eastside Community In-
vestments, Inc., Indianapolis, Ind.; Economic Opportunity Commission of Nassau Coun-
ty, Hempsted, New York; Greater Roxbury Development Corp., Boston, Mass.; Harlem
Commonwealth Council, New York, New York; Hough Area Development Corporation,
Cleveland, Ohio; Hunt's Point Community Local Development Corporation, Bronx,
New York; Mexican-American Unity Council, San Antonio, Texas; Pyramidwest,
Chicago, Illinois; Operation Life Community Development Corporation, Las Vegas,
Nevada; People Organized for Community Development, Pensacola, Florida; San Juan
Community Development Corp., San Juan, Puerto Rico; Southside Community Enter-
prises, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Spanish Speaking Unity Council, Oakland, California;
UDI Community Development Corp., Durham, North Carolina; Union Sarah Economic
Development Corp., St. Louis, Missouri; United Methodist Community Center, Omaha,
Nebraska. See Summary of CSA Funding Under Title VII of the Community Services
Act of 1974 (Community Services Administration Internal Document). As corporations
incorporated under state law, CDCs must have members or shareholders. But to
qualify for funds under Subpart VII community residents must hold in excess of fifty
percent of the places on their boards of directors. See Community Service Administra-
tion Regulations, Composition and Selection of CDC Boards of Directors, 45 C.F.R. §
1076.10-3 and § 1076.10-4 (1975).
8. Typical problems which CDCs have tried to solve with concrete programs
include housing shortages, general deterioration of the environment, the exodus of
skilled labor and upwardly mobile residents, and increasing rates of unemployment.
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Subpart VII outlines three general CDC activities: initiating and
sustaining community participation in CDC decision-making,9 induc-
ing and sustaining comprehensive economic development," and
underwriting the cost of social goods and services." CDCs can
therefore implement Subpart VII in a variety of ways. Creating an
institution capable of representing local interests in relations with
the larger public and capable of negotiating with governmental units
for improved social services may satisfy the statute as fully as
engaging in entrepreneurial activities or attempting to increase
employment in ghetto areas.
While Subpart VII outlines a general approach to economic im-
provement it leaves unmade the wealth of choices that will shape
the actual impact of CDCs upon the lives of residents of under-
developed areas.'" It says little about the practical issues of cor-
The projects proposed by and to CDCs are therefore usually designed to create jobs,
improve living conditions, and maximize profits for distribution.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 2982b (a) (1) (1976).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 2982a (1976).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2982a (4) (1976).
12. The Community Services Administration had defined an underdeveloped
area as follows:
To qualify as a Special Impact Area a community must possess a high in-
cidence of poverty and physical deterioration. Indices of such conditions
may include:
(1) median family incomes substantially below those of the
general community;
(2) high levels of unemployment or under-employment;
(3) high levels of dependency, as measured by numbers of
families receiving public assistance, food stamps, Medi-
caid, etc., numbers of families headed by a single
parent, or numbers of elderly couples or widowed
individuals;
(4) high percentages of substandard housing or old housing
stock, or absence of new construction;
(5) low and/or declining tax base, loss of commercial and
industrial jobs, and absence of or socially destructive
economic expansion; and
(6) absence of or inadequate social and community services.
To further qualify, Special Impact Areas must be sufficiently large to pro-
vide a viable base for long-term economic development. On the other hand, the area
must have a recognizable community of interest and be small enough to permit the at-
tainment of the required appreciable impact given the amount of funds that can be
reasonably anticipated to be available. Urban impact areas should generally be limited
to defined neighborhoods; rural impact areas will generally cover whole counties or
groups of adjacent counties or, in the case of Indian programs, an entire Indian reser-
vation. GUIDELINES FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION PLANNING GRANTS
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porate accountability and the allocation of power among the federal
government, CDC officials and the residents of underdeveloped
areas. The decision-making arrangement under the statute consists
of corporations which are designed to act on behalf of and be respon-
sible to the residents of the designated poverty area and a federal
agency, the Community Services Administration (hereafter CSA),
which retains funding control and veto power over the conduct of
the corporation."
Thus the scheme required by Subpart VII and the regulations
promulgated by the CSA cause CDCs to simultaneously display
some of the characteristics of a local government, a federal agency,
a business enterprise and a social welfare agency. Despite the
countervailing or competing interests, CDCs are apparently supposed
to integrate all of these functions into their daily activities. Most in-
stitutions, however, whether charitable, profit-making or govern-
mental, are internally structured so as to maximize a single unitary
objective, although their actions remain subject to countervailing or
competing interests." Thus, decision-making under Subpart VII
departs significantly from the traditions of visibility and account-
ability that are material to other social institutions that hold and
manage resources for identifiable constituencies.
The issue, therefore, is what kind of legal relationship between
area residents and CDCs would express and reflect the statutory re-
quirement of corporate responsibility to these residents. In explor-
ing and resolving this issue the CDC will be viewed as both the set-
ting in which decisions will be made and as a choice of alternative
formats for decision-making. The intention is to define the
significance of CDCs and the assumption is that, as legal entities,
UNDER TITLE VII-D SPECIAL IMPACT PROGRAMS, OF THE COMMUNITY SERVICES ACT OF
1974 3-4 (March, 1975) (hereinafter Guidelines). Although Title VII authorizes funds to
both urban and rural CDCs, this Article will deal exclusively with urban CDCs.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2982b (a) (1976). There is no explicit language in Subpart
VII authorizing or requiring the CSA to reverse particular CDC decisions. However,
the CSA has promulgated regulations which provide: "Except as otherwise provided
for by the terms of the grant no venture capital funds shall be used without the prior
approval of OED." GUIDELINES FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION PLANNING
GRANTS UNDER TITLE VII - D, SPECIAL IMPACT PROGRAMS, OF THE COMMUNITY SERVICES
ACT OF 1974 3-4 (March, 1975). The OED is the Office of Economic Development, the
division within the CSA which specifically supervises CDC activities.
14. See, e.g., A. HIRSHMAN, EXIT. VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970); Winter, State
Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.L. STUDIES 251
(1977); Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965); Note, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983
(1963).
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CDCs have an importance apart from the possibility that they will
produce the desired economic result. Specifically, the legal impor-
tance of CDCs derives from the fact that CDCs are located not only
in ghetto areas, but also somewhere in the national life of a free
enterprise democracy.
One of the primary concerns which will be dealt with in the
analysis to follow is the difficulty and the danger of attempting to
effect social change by doing good. The difficulty occurs because
whatever good is obtainable usually is mingled with adverse conse-
quences and because even the most admirable goals are seldom pur-
sued without a level of ambivalence that is pervasive enough to
distort the effort. Doing good is dangerous because of the risk that
self-appointed samaritans will irresponsibly exercise the power to
act in others' interests and instead will act according to their own
presumptions. In America, such action departs from the nation's
organizing principles and democratic traditions.
The dangers and difficulties of doing good can be summarized
by saying that doing good is not enough. Good must be done decently
so as not to degrade the doers or the beneficiaries. Though the
demands of decency seem insurmountable in many contexts, in
America these demands can be addressed and sometimes met
through the social institution charged with that responsibility, the
legal system.
An analysis of these issues, however, must be preceeded by
some factual background. Consequently, the first two sections of the
Article will consist of a discussion of the history of CDCs, Subpart
VII, and the current activities of CDCs. The Article will then ex-
amine the various aspects of CDCs which are alluded to by Subpart
VII, namely their political, economic and administrative dimensions.
The utility of this discussion will be tested in the fourth section by
analyzing the only judicial opinion which has involved an interpreta-
tion of Subpart VII, Corrugated Container Corp. v. CSA.'5 It is sug-
gested that this opinion provides an unduly restrictive interpreta-
tion of the role of CDCs in'the development process and that, in ef-
fect, it consigns CDCs to the task of serving as adjuncts to the Com-
munity Services Administration. The policy implications of this in-
terpretation of CDCs will be explored and it will be shown that an
interpretation of CDCs which takes their corporate character into
account is far preferable to that adopted by the court in Corrugated
Container. The interpretation of CDCs which is proposed by the
15. 429 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Va. 1977).
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author is preferable to that adopted in Corrugated Container; it is
an interpretation which treats CDCs as institutions designed to
resolve and mediate the conflicts that inevitably occur throughout
the development process. In arriving at this conclusion, however,
the Article will show that CDCs, as presently structured, fail to pro-
vide their constituents the same degree of legal protection provided
by other social institutions which hold and manage resources for
identifiable constituencies. It is suggested, however, that this defect
can be remedied by a congressional amendment to Subpart VII that
would simultaneously increase the autonomy of CDC decisionmakers
and increase their accountability to residents of communities in
which CDCs are located by providing these residents with legally
recognized rights analogous to those possessed by shareholders of
business corporations.
HISTORY OF CDCs
Social History
Understanding the origins of CDCs requires an appreciation of
the fact that urban low-income communities lack not only material
resources but the institutional means to obtain them. Although
there are some influential institutions in low-income ethnic com-
munities, e.g., the church and civic and fraternal associations," most
economic institutions such as businesses, banks, credit unions and in-
surance companies, have not been owned or controlled by residents
of these communities and until recently have not even functioned
there.17
CDCs represent an attempt by residents of low-income com-
munities to establish an institutional resource for the community
which would be owned and controlled by community residents and
would help to create economic and social structures directed to their
needs. In short, the origins of CDCs can be located in an apparent
belief-supported by substantial empirical evidence-of many of the
urban poor and their leaders in the mid-sixties that the political,
16. See generally A. MEIER AND E. RUDWICK. FROM PLANTATION TO GHETTO
(1970) (especially ch. VI); W. TABB, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GHETTO (1970); S.
WILHELM, WHO NEEDS THE NEGRO? (1970); WARREN, POLITICS AND THE GHETTO (1969); L.
KENNEDY, THE NEGRO PEASANT TURNS CITYWARD (1969); J. H. FRANKLIN, FROM
SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (1947); L. RUCHAMES. RACE, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STORY OF
FEPC (1953); R. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO (1948); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1957); L. BENNETT, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER (1966);
I. LIGHT, ETHNIC ENTERPRISE IN AMERICA (1972); K. B. CLARK, DARK GHETTO (1965).
17. See, e.g., W. TABB, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE BLACK GHETTO 22
(1970).
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economic and social systems had not delivered to them a fair share
of the system's benefits and rewards and that these benefits would
never be forthcoming through the extant social institutions. 8
Fortified by this perception, some of these leaders attempted
to create new institutions. A minister in Philadelphia organized a
job-training system and an investment trust which opened several
enterprises. 9 In Cleveland, Ohio, leaders of church and social service
organizations formed a community corporation and attempted to
develop housing projects and industrial organizations." A militant
organization in Rochester, New York, FIGHT, began by demanding
jobs for black people at Kodak and Xerox plants, and attempted to
engage in business development on its own with assistance from
Xerox.21
The dual objective of most of these early efforts was to
establish viable economic organizations in low-income communities,
and to offer area residents an opportunity to participate in the deci-
sion-making process of these organizations. Leaders of some of the
organizations envisioned a more ambitious role than simply produc-
ing and distributing goods and services. They believed that new in-
stitutions could be created in low-income communities which could
simultaneously sponsor indigenous entrepreneurship and serve as a
catalyst for inducing further economic, social and political develop-
ment.' For example, the CDC could bargain with banks on behalf of
entrepreneurs to obtain capital for them, which in turn would pro-
vide jobs and in some instances desired goods and services to com-
munity residents; governmental agencies could be approached by
CDC officials to obtain government contracts for local businesses,
government grants for housing development, and grants for in-
frastructural improvement; and finally, attempts could be made to
persuade large private businesses to locate plants or branch offices
in these communities. It was also contemplated that profits from the
businesses owned by the CDC would be invested in community ser-
18. See Innis, Separatist Economics: A New Social Contract, in BLACK
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 50 (Haddad and Pugh eds. 1969); A. BRAZIER. BLACK SELF
DETERMINATION (1969); H. CRUSE, REBELLION OR REVOLUTION (1969); S. CARMICHAEL AND
C. HAMILTON. BLACK PowER (1967).
19. See note 5 supra.
20. Id
21. Al
22. See note 18 supra; see also M. KOTTER, NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT
(1969).
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vices such as recreational facilities and day care centers." It would
be misleading, however, to give the impression that CDCs sprang in-
to being in the 1960's because of an awakening of the urban poor to
their status in American society. Several social forces helped to
create an awareness of the need for this new institutional form. For
a brief period in the sixties, society appeared to be willing to
expend substantial sums of money to help eradicate racial discrimi-
nation and poverty. Civil rights legislation was passed," an anti-
poverty program was launched and private industry committed both
money and manpower to solving the urban crisis.'5 None of these ef-
forts was aimed at or succeeded in institutionalizing structures
within low-income communities that would enable poor people to ad-
vocate and advance their interests collectively. That is, established
institutions offered aid and assistance to individual minorities and
poor people on the assumption that this aid and assistance would
enable these individuals to acquire the resources necessary to suc-
ceed in the larger society.
While not eschewing the assistance to individuals, leaders in
low-income communities realized that an entity was needed that
could work on behalf of the entire community, articulate the needs
of the community to those institutions that were attempting to over-
come the underdeveloped status of the communities, or alternatively,
oppose those institutions which were perceived as barriers to the
community's growth and development.
Early examples of the CDC in Rochester, New York,
and Cleveland, Ohio, suggest that the ambitious goals [of
CDCs] may have arisen out of a sharply increasing recog-
nition of the significance of outside influences in the
affairs of the neighborhood. Many leaders had in the past
recognized the destructive meaning of institutions that
23. See Note, Community Development Corporations: Operations and Financ-
ing, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1558 (1970).
24. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq. (1976).
25. In 1966, 163 life insurance companies pledged to contribute $1 billion for
an "urban investment program to alleviate the problems of the core areas of our
cities." See Conroy, What the Insurance Companies Are Doing in the Ghetto, 25 Bus.
LAWYER 27, 28 (1969) (Special Issue entitled Business in the Ghetto). In 1968 the Urban
Coalition in New York City established a lending and management assistance company,
Coalition Venture Corporation, which lent over $1 million to minority businesses in the
area. See Economic Strategies for the Ghetto, 4 CITY ALMANAC 1, 6, 12 (April 1970). In
1968 the National Alliance of Businessmen was established as a joint enterprise by
some of the nation's largest corporations and the federal government. In its first year
of operation this organization located jobs for 125,000 persons. See E. BANFIELD, THE
UNHEAVENLY CITY 111 (1970).
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had no allegiance or commitment whatsoever to their
neighborhoods and yet determined what happened there;
but enough general recognition among residents awaited
major conflicts with some of these outside influences. In
one instance, it was a mayoralty campaign after a major
civil disturbance; in the other, it was a dispute with a ma-
jor local corporation. In both instances, after a successful
conclusion of the conflict, neighborhood leaders moved
aggressively into a larger, more ambitious campaign to
bring about full local control through community control
and economic resources. And that required a new institu-
tion, the CDC.2"
In summary, the social climate in the sixties was largely responsible
for bringing into being a new institutional form in urban ghettos; an
organization premised on the notion that resources which were
essential to the development of the community should be controlled
to some extent by the inhabitants of the community, whether those
resources were generated by community residents or outside
sources.
It is against this background that the federal legislation pro-
viding funds to CDCs must be viewed. The extent to which Subpart
VII helped or hindered the development of CDCs can be ascertained
by first examining the legislative history of the statute.
Legislative History
Several significant social welfare statutes which affected
minorities and the poor were enacted in the mid-sixties. Subpart VII
was one of these statutes. It originated in 1966 when Senators Ken-
nedy and Javits introduced an amendment to Title I of the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964 which authorized Special Impact Programs
for urban areas with high concentrations of low-income people." The
purpose of the amendment, according to one of its sponsors, was to
create a federally funded program which concentrated on the prob-
lems of poverty areas rather than poor people.28 Projects under this
new program were to be designed "to arrest tendencies toward
dependency, chronic unemployment, and rising community ten-
26. See S. Perry, supra note 5, at 60.
27. See Report of Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 11 S. REP.
No. 1666, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (hereinafter Report).
28. See S. Perry, Federal Support for CDCs: Some of the History and Issues
of Community Control, 3 REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 17, 23 (1973).
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sions."'2 They were to be implemented in poor neighborhoods,
"employ the resources of the private sector- business, nonprofit
groups, and the residents of proverty areas themselves-to supple-
ment present government efforts themselves"' and were to be of
"sufficient size and scope to have an appreciable impact.
31
Although Senators Kennedy and Javits did not experience
significant difficulty in getting the amendment enacted, implementa-
tion of the objectives delineated therein proved difficult. The
authority for administering this program was delegated by the
Director of OEO to the Secretary of Labor.2 One year later, in 1967,
Congress revised this amendment, and the Senate Committee
responsible for drafting the original amendment as well as its revi-
sion, emphasized that community participation was an intergral part
of the program:
Experience of the first year's operation demonstrates that
successful program operation, including active participa-
tion by business, requires and depends on the utmost
cooperation of community residents. That cooperation, in
the view of the committee, will best be achieved through
effective and substantial participation of the residents in
program decisions, responsibility and benefits. Community
and community based corporations, which have
demonstrated their potential utility as vehicles for such
participation should be encouraged ... to undertake spon-
sorship of programs under this part.-
The Committee further commented that the Department of Labor
had failed to carry out Congress' intentions with respect to com-
munity economic development.,
29. See Report, supra note 27, at 12.
30. Id. at 13.
31. Id. at 12.
32. See Report of Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 32 S. REP.
No. 563, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
33. Id. at 34.
34. Although the committee had intended that the funds provided for
this program be concentrated primarily on economic and community
development and manpower training, the Labor Department, to whom the
program was delegated, used a substantial part of the funds for the con-
centrated employment program. Economic development activities, in par-
ticular were deemphasized. Since the concentrated employment program
is given a separate authorization . . . the special impact funds this year
should be used as the committee originally intended.
Id. at 32.
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Thus, the 1967 Amendment provided that programs receiving
federal funds must stimulate economic and business development.
The programs were to provide, among other things, financial and
other incentives to business to locate in or near the area served;
create training programs which would support and complement
economic, business and community development programs; and final-
ly attempt to involve businesses, both inside and outside the ghetto
areas, in the community development effort.5
Once again, however, the Congressional purpose was frustrated.
The opportunity for local ghetto residents to participate in the im-
plementation of this new program was delayed because President
Johnson airected that its administration be shared by the Depart-
ments of Labor, Commerce, Agriculture and the Economic Oppor-
tunity Administration." The result was a diffusion of responsibility
that eventually reflected the particular orientation of these govern-
mental agencies rather than the needs of ghetto residents and
poverty areas. The Department of Labor dispensed grants to in-
digenous businesses to provide jobs to unemployed residents of
ghetto areas.' The Department of Agriculture projects in Kentucky
and North Carolina reflected the general policy of reducing out-
migration from rural areas by attracting industry." Even the Com-
merce Department's approach of involving the business community
in helping to solve the problems of poverty areas did not involve
any participation by residents of those areas." OEO did adopt an ap-
proach that attempted to foster community-based business and
economic development activities by a locally owned and controlled
community organization. But, OEO received the smallest share, $1.6
million, of the $20 million appropriation which it used as a grant to
the CDC in Cleveland, Ohio.'" According to Geoffry Faux, the first
administrator of this new program:
35. Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, §151, Ti-
tle I, Part D, 81 Stat. 672. Although Congress expressed its dissatisfaction with the
absence of community participation in implementing the 1966 amendment, see note 34
supra, the 1967 amendment contained no mechanism for insuring that the money
allocated for the program would be spent in a manner consistent with the priorities of
area residents.
36. 33 Fed. Reg. 9850-51 (1968).
37. WESTINGHOUSE LEARNING CORPORATION, AN EVALUATION OF FISCAL YEAR
1968 SPECIAL IMPACT PROGRAMS iii-iv, Vol. I, Summary Report (1970).
38. Id. at iv-v.
39. Id. at vii.
40. The CDC was the Hough Area Development Corporation. See OEO An-
nual Report for fiscal years 1969-70, p. 70. According to one of the members of the
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In the winter of 1968-69, Bureau of the Budget officials
under the outgoing Johnson administration determined
that the OEO project had met the intentions of Title I-D
but that the projects in the Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, and Labor had not. The Bureau recommended
that the entire program be run by OEO.'1
The Director of OEO was instructed by President Nixon, who
adopted the Bureau's recommendation, to take full responsibility for
the Special Impact Program for the 1969 fiscal year."2 He continued
to operate the program from 1969 to 1972 without any legislative
change.
In 1972 Congress combined the Title I Special Impact Program
with the Title III Rural Loan Program into a unified Community
Economic Development section which became Title VII of the
Economic Opportunity Act." Several provisions were added to Title
VII to expand the program's objectives, to give CDCs greater flex-
ibility to carry out economic development activities, to insure their
sound management and commercial success, and to attempt to in-
sure the durability of CDC projects if federal funds were ter-
minated." Additionally, Congress identified Community Develop-
ment Corporations as one of the organizational forms eligible to
receive federal funds under Title VII."3 Finally, in order to insure
OEO staff at that time, the major reason that OEO adopted the approach which it did
was, "economic development had to be based upon what the residents themselves
wanted to do and upon their definition of their problems." See Perry, Federal Support
for CDCs: Some of the History and Issues of Community Control, 3 REV. OF BLACK
POL. HISTORY 17, 22 (1973). The author stated that the OEO approach:
was based on taking a new look at what the low-income black com-
munities were already trying to do for themselves, and what it seemed
that these neighborhoods (especially the young men) most wanted - that
is, self-determination, programs without strings, community control, and
something besides services, something more real somehow, like business
development or housing.
Id
41. Faux, Politics and Bureaucracy in Community-Controlled Economic
Developmen, 36 L. AND CONTEM. PROB. 277, 285 (1971).
42. Id.
43. See Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, S.
REP. No. 92-331, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
44. Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-424, § 25, 86
Stat. 688. Title VII of the 1972 amendment is almost identical to an earlier version
which appeared as S. 2007, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 7 (1971). S. 2007 was passed by Con-
gress in 1971, but vetoed by President Nixon. See 7 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1634 (1971).
45. Pub. L. No. 92-424, § 715.
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that community residents played a role in this development process,
Congress made responsiveness to area residents a formal condition
of receiving federal funds.'6
The mid-seventies heralded major legislative changes. On
January 4, 1975, President Ford signed the Community Services Act
of 1974 which superseded the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,
and replaced the Office of Economic Opportunity with the Community
Services Administration. 7 Title VII of the Economic Opportunity
Act became Subpart VII of the new statute and contained most of
old Title VII as well as several additions.'8 The two most significant
additions were: (1) CDCs became the organizational form for receiv-
ing funds under Title VII in urban areas;'9 and (2) Congress required
each CDC to have "a governing body not less than 50 per centum of
the members of which are area residents ... ."I Although there
have been some technical revisions of Subpart VII since 1975, no
substantive changes have occurred.
CURRENT ACTIVITIES OF CDCs
Analysis of the way in which contemporary CDCs are operating
under Subpart VII illustrates how these corporations have attempted
to implement the purposes delineated by the architects of the
statute. It also reveals that the multiple, ambitious purposes of Sub-
part VII have been reduced to a small number of concrete
possibilities.
Although only a handful of CDCs exist, they control millions of
dollars targeted for community development. Over $173,000,000 in
Subpart VII funds have been distributed to thirty-three CDCs from
1967 to 1977. 1' Currently, twenty-five urban CDCs, located in inner-
city (ghetto) areas, are recipients of Subpart VII funds.5 The
46. Id. at § 712 (a).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2981 (1976).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2984 (1976) authorizes the Director of the CSA to make or
guarantee loans to CDCs, families and local cooperatives for business, housing and
community development; also, the Administrator of the Small Business Administra-
tion, and the Secretaries of HUD and Agriculture are directed to assist CDCs in carry-
ing out their programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2985 (a)-(c) (1976).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2982 (1976).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2982 (b) (1) (1976).
51. See summary of CSA Funding Under Title VII of the Community Services
Act of 1974 Fiscal Year 1968-1977 (Produced by CSA, Washington, D.C.).
52 See note 7 supra for locations of urban CDCs.
53. Summary of CSA Funding, supra note 51. Most CDCs are funded for two-
year periods. The grants are generally for a minimum of $1 million, and include both
administrative and investment funds. See Guidelines, supra note 12, at 6.
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geographical areas in which they operate are primarily residential,
with high population densities, substandard housing and low tax
bases.u Each CDC has a full-time staff, and a board of directors com-
posed primarily of residents of the area in which the CDC operates.'
As of 1973, eighteen of the twenty-five CDCs owned or had in-
vestments in one hundred and forty-two businesses, ranging from
substantial manufacturing plants to small retail stores." Thirty-
three CDCs, including those in rural areas, have provided jobs for
approximately 7,000 persons.57
54. See note 12 supra.
55. Approximately one-third of the funds received from the average federally
funded urban CDC are used for full-time staff salaries and other administrative ex-
penses. See ABT. ASSOCIATES, AN EVALUATION OF THE SPECIAL IMPACT PROGRAM: FINAL
REPORT Vol. 2, 137 (1973). Most Executive Directors of urban CDCs have completed
college (89%) and more than two-thirds (69%) have completed some graduate work.
Fifty percent of the CDC Executive Directors specialized in business administration
while in school. See R. KELLEY, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS OF CDCs 4 (Center for Com-
munity Economic Development, Cambridge, Mass. 1974). The average size of the board
of directors of urban CDCs is 20 members. See R. KELLEY. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
IN DIRECTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 44 (1976) (hereinafter Kelley). The CSA has
issued regulations governing the size of the CDC boards which state, in part:
CDCs are free to determine the size of their boards of directors. In doing
so, CDCs must strike a balance between various, sometimes conflicting
considerations. On the one hand, the board must be of a sufficient size as
to provide adequate representation to both the target area residents and
the business community . . .- to permit the formation of working commit-
tees without requiring the same individuals to serve on more than one or
two, and to insure that even a minimum quorum is still large enough to
represent the community and legitimately reach basic policy and program
decisions. On the other hand, the board must be small enough to permit
business to be conducted in an efficient and expeditious way. It has been
the experience of OED that the ideal size for a CDC board is between 15
and 30 members. Generally, anything larger tends to become unwieldy,
while anything smaller overtaxes the capacity of individual members and
limits the board's representativeness. Where a CDC chooses to have a
board larger than 30 or smaller than 15 members, it shall explain its
choices to OED.
CSA Composition and Selection of CDC Boards of Directors, 45 C.F.R. § 1076.10-3
(1975). Approximately eighty percent of all CDC boards are residents of the areas in
which CDCs are located. See Kelley, supra note 55, at 48.
56. ABT. ASSOCIATES, AN EVALUATION OF THE SPECIAL IMPACT PROGRAM: FINAL
REPORT 124, Vol. 4 (1973) (hereinafter ABT. ASSOCIATES, EVALUATION).
57. See THE NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
THE CDC MODEL: A DEVELOPMENT VEHICLE IN POVERTY COMMUNITIES 2 (Washington
D.C., 1977). This report is reprinted in the published Hearings Before a Subcommittee
of the House of Representatives' Committee on Government Operations, 95th Cong.,
First Sess. 394-433 (1977) (hereinafter Hearings). The subcommittee held hearings on
the operation of the Community Services Administration on March 1, 3, 23, 30 and 31,
1977. Id.
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It would be quite inaccurate to group the existing CDCs
together on the grounds that they all grew out of a single statute.
Their sources are as diverse as those of conventional corporations
and thus, each CDC reflects different priorities, perceptions, degrees
of corporate responsibility to area residents and methods of imple-
menting the statutory purposes. The operating CDCs fall, accord-
ing to origin, into four major categories. The first category is
comprised of CDCs which were the outgrowth of community
mobilization to defend a real or perceived threat to the community.
The second category consists of those CDCs which were created by
community leaders for the specific purpose of engaging in economic
development activities. The third group of CDCs grew out of
previously existing government-sponsored programs, such as Com-
munity Action Agencies and Model Cities programs. The final
category of CDCs was formed as a result of the cooperative efforts
of persons living outside and inside of the ghetto.
CDCs in the first category reflect large initial investments of
resident time, energy and money. For example, the East Boston
CDC was incorporated by the East Boston Neighborhood Council
(EBNC), a formerly inactive neighborhood organization formed in
the 1930's as a civic improvement organization "which was reac-
tivated after many years of inactivity to rally East Bostonians to
mobilize against" the proposed expansion of Logan Airport which
borders on East Boston." For a number of years local media had
publicized and expressed concern over the traffic, noise, and pollu-
tion that would be generated by an enlarged airport.59 Not only was
the EBNC, working with other local organizations, successful in
resisting the construction of a planned new runway but it soon ex-
panded its attempts to contain the airport into an effort to develop
the community.' Membership in EBNC is open to everyone who
lives or works in East Boston and is fourteen years of age or older.9 '
It was, at the time of the formation of the CDC, the one community
organization which was both closely identified with the issues which
affected the community, and without direct ties or obligations to
58. J. MACPHEE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY AUTONOMY IN EAST
BOSTON 4 (1973) (hereinafter MacPhee).
59. Center for Community Economic Development Newsletter 19 (March 15,
1972).
60. See THE CENTER FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE CAM-
BRIDGE INSTITUTE, PROFILES IN COMMUNITY BASED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (Cam-
bridge, Mass. 1971) (hereinafter Profiles).
61. MacPhee, supra note 58, at 10.
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city or state government.2 Therefore, EBNC was a logical choice for
sponsoring the East Boston CDC (EBCDC), at least in the context of
having legitimacy in the eyes of the residents of the community. The
CDC was incorporated as a stock corporation in 1971 and all of its
outstanding stock was issued to the EBNC. EBCDC has been involved
in property acquisition and development through a subsidiary that
was formed to acquire an apartment building and a nonprofit com-
pany that holds waterfront property." Corporate assets have also
been invested in several service and industrial enterprises."
Another urban CDC which arose out of a political issue com-
munity organization is the North Lawndale Economic Development
Corporation. During the late sixties community residents became
alarmed at the prospect that a major developer in Chicago had plans
for the area which would, if effectuated, displace half of the area's
population.' "The community responded by raising $80,000 to hire
its own consultant for economic planning. The consulting firm's
recommendations were reviewed and accepted by some organiza-
tions representing the community."" Among other proposals, the
consulting firm recommended that three existing community
organizations, each of which represented different factions within
the community, consolidate to form one strong, powerful and
representative organization.
In November 1968, within two months of the private plan-
ner's recommendations, the Lawndale People's Planning
and Action Conference (LPPAC) was formed as a com-
munity voice in planning for social and community
development. LPPAC is a non-profit corporation with all
residents of the community entitled to vote at member-
ship meetings.87
One month later the North Lawndale Economic Development
Corporation (NLEDC), a for-profit corporation, was formed. 8 NLEDC
is the economic development arm of Lawndale People's Planning and
Action Conference, and concentrates its efforts almost exclusively in
commercial and land development. It has purchased land for the con-
62. Id at 11.
63. See ART. ASSOCIATES, EVALUATION, supra note 56 at Vol. 3, p. 88.
64. Id
65. See Profiles, supra note 60, at 37.
66. Id
67. THE CENTER FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, CENTER FOR COM-
MUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT NEWSLETTER 1-2 (Cambridge, Mass. September, 1972).
68. Id
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struction of an industrial park, residential housing and a shopping
center. 9
The second category of CDCs tends to place primary emphasis
on economic development; for example, the Harlem Commonwealth
Council (HCC) in New York City.70 The residents of the area served
by HCC, central and most of East Harlem, are predominantly black
and Puerto Rican.7 1 Organized as a non-profit corporation by twelve
prominent Harlem leaders,72 HCC's board of directors has thirty
members, twelve of whom are the original founders. Eight directors
are elected by the United Block Association (a neighborhood coali-
tion of Harlem residents) and ten are appointed to the board by com-
munity organizations operating within Harlem, including the
NAACP, the Urban League and local church groups." From its
inception, the Harlem Commonwealth Council has been strongly
committed to business and commercial development and has placed
little, if any, emphasis on social development.' Although it has
invested in some small retail and service ventures, its primary em-
phasis has been on larger businesses. It owns two manufacturing
companies, has developed a land banking program, and plans to
eventually buy enough land in Harlem to construct 400 housing
units and 300,000 square feet of commercial office space.7 5
The Hough Area Development Corporation, another CDC which
fits into this economic oriented category, had its genesis in the col-
lective decision of a group of community leaders in the Hough area
of Cleveland to develop their own programs for the community.78
Located in a decaying ghetto of approximately 60,000 people, almost
69. 1&
70. Another CDC which falls into this category is the Hunts Point Community
Local Development Corporation (HPCLDC) which is located in the southwestern por-
tion of the Bronx in New York City. Seventy-five percent of the residents of this area
are Puerto Rican. Since its inception in June, 1971, HPCLDC has attempted to im-
prove the general business climate within the area. See, L. Robbins, Profile: Hunts
Point Community Local Development Corporation 6-9, CCED NEWSLETTER (August,
1974).
71. Profiles, supra note 60, at 20.
72. Id. at 21.
73. Interview with Ms. Sylvia Brown, Program Analyst, Office of Economic
Development, Community Services Administration, December 6, 1976.
74. B. STEIN, HARLEM COMMONWEALTH COUNCIL - BUSINESS AS A STRATEGY FOR
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (1974); Profile: Harlem Commonwealth Council 4 CCED
NEWSLETTER (May, 1974).
75. See ABT. ASSOCIATES, EVALUATION, supra note 56, at 134; Interview with
Sylvia Brown, supra note 73.
76. See CCED NEWSLETTER, supra note 74, at 3-4.
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all black, this CDC has a thirty-nine person board of directors com-
posed of both community residents and representatives from com-
munity organizations." Membership in the corporation is open to all
area residents and the board is elected by the membership at its an-
nual meeting." HDC's principal venture is the Martin Luther King
Shopping Plaza which provides housing for low-income families in
elevated town houses constructed over a mall, with the ground floor
constituting a shopping area containing seventeen businesses.79 Ad-
ditionally, HDC owns ventures in the manufacturing, service, and
retail areas, including a McDonald's franchise."
The third category of CDCs includes those which grew out of
previously existing government-sponsored programs, such as Com-
munity Action and Model Cities programs. Usually, their boards in-
clude representatives from the neighborhood organizations that
serve low-income persons. Specificially, the Boards of Directors of
the Union Sarah Economic Development Corporation in St. Louis,
and the Denver Community Development Corporation include a
large proportion of representatives from community organizations.
The Union Sarah CDC was established by the Union Sarah Com-
munity Corporation which was already responsible for administering
all federal anti-poverty programs in the area, and which retained fifty
percent of the CDC's stock."' Union Sarah's functions are particularly
integrated: for example, it is the landlord of a medical center which
offers services on a sliding fee scale and employs one hundred peo-
ple. The corporate assets are concentrated in housing and property
development, and minority contractors are employed for
renovation."2
The Denver Community Development Corporation serves a
population of approximately 100,000 people, three-fifths of whom are
Mexican American." The motivating forces for the creation of this
organization were the Neighborhood Action Councils, branches of
local Community Action Agencies." One of these Community Action
Agencies, the West Side Action Council, established a local develop-
77. ABT. ASSOCIATES, AN EVALUATION OF THE SPECIAL IMPACT PROGRAM: IN-
TERIM REPORT 14-21, Vol. 3, (1973).
78. Id
79. See ABT. ASSOCIATES, EVALUATION supra note 56, at Vol. 3, p. 167.
80. Id
81. See Profiles, supra note 60, at 45.
82. ABT. ASSOCIATES, INC., AN EVALUATION OF THE SPECIAL IMPACT PROGRAM:
FINAL REPORT, Vol. I, pp. 345-56 (1973).
83. See Profiles, supra note 60, at 65.
84. Id
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ment corporation which subsequently formed, under the auspices of
the Neighborhood Action Councils and the United Latin American
Businessmen's Association, the non-profit Denver CDC.85 It has a
twenty-one member board of directors which consists in part of
representatives from community organizations in the Denver area.
These representatives then elect at-large members from the area in
which the CDC is located." It has acquired a 38% interest in a
building which rents space to a supermarket, a refrigeration com-
pany and a check cashing booth. Fifty-percent of the supermarket is
owned by the CDC. It also operates a wholly-owned supermarket in
another location, and manages a wholly-owned office building."
The fourth and final category of CDCs includes those which
grew from the initiatives of persons living outside the ghetto area.
The prime example, Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation,
began when Senator Robert Kennedy brought together some of
New York's most influential business figures. They subsequently
agreed to set up a companion corporation, Bedford-Stuyvesant
Development and Service Corporation, which was composed of prom-
inent people and was designed to persuade outside investors to
develop businesses in the area." The Restoration Corporation is in-
volved in assorted business enterprises, housing activities and prop-
erty development. It is the largest and most diversified CDC in
existence."
As is readily seen from the preceeding discussion of the origins
of CDCs, the diversity of organizational structure, venture acquisi-
tions, and related activities of urban CDCs make it difficult to com-
prehensively describe them in a few pages. The discussion should,
however, be sufficient to refute any inference that they are conven-
tional or one-dimensional organizations. As a prelude to determining
if and how the opposing tendencies of CDCs can be integrated, the
following section will isolate and discuss the implications of the prin-
cipal disparate aspects of CDCs.
85. 1&
86. Interview with Craig Hathaway, Program Analyst, Office of Economic
Development, Community Service Administration, December 6, 1976.
87. Id.
88. Following a reorganization of both Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Cor-
poration and Bedford-Stuyvesant Development and Service Corporation, the latter
had only one employee who was to serve as chief executive officer and general counsel.
The remainder of the D & S staff was transferred to the Restoration staff. The boards
of Restoration and D & S meet jointly and periodically. Craig Hathaway Interview, Id.
89. See THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LAW PROJECT, BEDFORD-
STUYVESANT: RARE URBAN SUCCESS STORY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LAW PROJECT
REPORT 1 (Earl Warren Legal Institute, Berkeley, Calif. July/August, 1976).
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POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF SUBPART VII
Since decision-making under Subpart VII can proceed from a
variety of purposes and follow assorted political and economic im-
pulses, it is necessary to explore the various contexts in which
CDCs can attain responsibility to area residents. The concept of
responsibility does not supply an operational standard that can be
used as a criterion for evaluating particular outcomes. Only deci-
sions that are clearly corrupted by conflicts of interest can be called
indifferent to area residents; even then the CSA's approval might
legally suffice to redeem them, since it would provide an indepen-
dent judgment that the proposed project serves statutory purposes
and local needs." Consequently, the concept of responsibility will be
approached as an aspect of the long term relationship between
CDCs and area residents.
Subpart VII and the regulations issued pursuant thereto sug-
gest several routes to responsible decision-making which can be
organized into alternative relationships between CDCs and area
residents. The following three approaches are metaphors that
organize several possible relationships so that they can be viewed as
potential sources of responsible decisions.
Approaches: Three Patterns of Organizations
Exposing political, economic and legal approaches to the
responsibility requirement of Subpart VII will be revealing. It will
show how Subpart VII could operate if the analysis is abstract
enough to cover the full range of options, yet concrete enough to
convey the tangible differences between and opportunity for resi-
dent participation in CDC decision-making and conflict resolution
under each approach. It is apparent that no single approach can ad-
dress the enduring demands of development, for the development
process requires diverse responses to changing realities and entails
an enlarged capacity and diversification of the system to deal with
increasingly complex conditions. Deciding whether the responsibility
requirement partakes of democractic theory, Gallup polls,
bureaucratic ballast, or the peculiar pattern of compromise
articulated in American corporate law will, however, reflect assump-
tions about the character of the contemplated changes, and the
extent to which they are subject to control.
90. For example, it would be very difficult for residents of the area to
challenge a decision made by the CDC to purchase a housing complex from a member
of the CDC's board of directors at a price substantially in excess of the apparent
market value if the Community Services Administration approved the expenditure.
See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
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A. Political Approach
Subpart VII's commitment to participation, and emphasis on
community control, suggests that CDCs were deliberately given a
political dimension."' The political CDC would be organized to reflect
and would operate to give priority to the political purposes of the
Act.
The political approach assumes that a CDC's allocation of
resources, like other political decisions that redistribute wealth, can
be appropriately controlled by small numbers of intensely interested
people. Ghetto residents' participation in the political decision-
making process would therefore be presumed to be analogous to the
involvement of other constituencies in other political systems, and
would be primarily prospective. First, residents would be directly or
indirectly enfranchised to elect CDC directors. 2 Second, residents
could affiliate with local organizations or, in effect, form a federated
system to amplify their impact as electors and increase their
general political influence.
Absent extreme or systematic inequities, the political model
would produce losers, but not legally injured minorities." Since the
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 2982b (1976). The CSA, through its regulations has also
attempted to clearly delineate the relationship of area residents to CDCs: "It is the
clear intent of Title VII that CDCs be self-help organizations controlled by and respon-
sible to low income residents." CSA Composition and Selection of CDC Boards of Direc-
tors, 45 C.F.R. § 1076, 10-2 (1975); Fau, supra note 5, at 29. ("The term 'community
development corporation' is used to identify organizations created and controlled by
people living in impoverished areas......") Id.; Perry, Federal Support for CD Cs. Some
of the History and Issues of Community Control, 3 REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 17 (1973)
("[C]ommunity economic development is the creation or strengthening of economic
organizations . . . that are controlled or owned by the residents of the area in which
they are located or in which they will exert primary influence.") Id at 27; J. Rivera,
Community Control of Economic Development Planning: A Study of the Recipient
Beneficiaries of Change as the Actors of Change (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Brandeis University, 1972) ("During all the development stages, the CDC serves as the
community-owned vehicle through which target group members can participate in ac-
tions designed to benefit them and their community.") Id- at 32; A. BLAUSTEIN AND G.
FAUX, THE STAR SPANGLED HUSTLE (1972) ("The Common theme of all of them (CDCs)
was control of the corporation by representatives of the depressed neighborhood or
area ..... ) Id. at 180.
92. Under Subpart VII, and as CDCs currently operate, residents' freedom to
elect the directors of their choice is curtailed by CSA specifications about who shall sit
as directors and CDC eligibility requirements for voters. See note 55 supra.
93. The political system is such that in the absence of discrimination, fraud, or
other forms of misconduct, the outcome reached by the electorate goes unchallenged.
If a voter fails to achieve his aim, he has "lost" as part of an equitable political process.
See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974) (a voter has a right to have
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legal system cannot ordinarily supply standards for judging political
decisions, legal claims by defeated partisans against a political CDC
would be untenable. As political officials, directors could largely ig-
nore the opinions of unorganized or uninfluential ghetto residents.
The directors of political CDCs would also be expected to serve
their own interest in maintaining control over the organization and
staying in office.
Beyond the extent to which state corporation statutes require
specific disclosures," the political model would not even obligate
his vote fairly counted); Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S.
45, 50 (1959) (absent discrimination, states have broad powers to determine the condi-
tions under which suffrage may be exercised); Hubbard v. Ammerman, 465 F.2d 1169,
1182 (5th Cir. 1972) ("In the absence of a statute to the contrary, none but a candidate
claiming to have been injured by illegalities therein occuring can contest the certified
results of an election.").
94. Such disclosures take the form of requirements that annual reports,
minutes, and membership lists be kept and made available to members. See, e.g., N.Y.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 513(b) (McKinney Supp. 1978-79): "[Tihe treasurer
shall make an annual report to the members . . . or board . . . concerning the assets
held under this section (assets received for specific purposes) and the use made of such
assets and of the income thereof." Section 519 provides:
(a) The board shall present at the annual meeting of members a report...
showing in appropriate detail the following: (1) The assets and liabilities
... (2) The principal changes in assets and liabilities . . . (3) The revenue
and receipts of the corporation . . . (4) The expenses or disbursements of
the corporation ... (5) The number of members of the corporation ... a
statement of increases or decreases of such number . . . and a statement
of . . . where the names and places of residence of the current members
can be found.
(b) The annual report ... shall be filed with the records of the corporation
and . . . entered in the minutes ....
§ 621 provides:
(a) [Elvery corporation shall keep, at the office of the corporation, correct
and complete books and records of account and minutes ... and ... a list
or record containing the names and addresses of all members ... ; (b) Any
person who shall have been a member of record for at least six months ...
or holding at least 5% of any class of capital certificates ... upon at least
five days written demand shall have the right to examine . . . during
usual business hours, its minutes . . . or record of members and to make
extracts therefrom; (c) Upon ... written request ... the corporation shall
give or mail to such member an annual balance sheet and profit and loss
statement ... for the the preceding fiscal year and ... the most recent in-
terim balance sheet ....
§ 718 provides: "(a) If a member or creditor of a corporation ... or (other) state official
makes a written demand on a corporation to inspect a current list of directors and
officers . . . the corporation shall . . . make the list available for such inspection at its
office during usual business hours." For similar, but less detailed provisions, see also
ILLINOIS GENERAL NOT FOR PROFIT CORPORATION ACT, ILL. ANN. STAT., §§ 163a24 and
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directors to keep the electorate informed. Absent a preexisting
organized political system, Subpart VII might be construed to prompt
more than the random involvement of a few ghetto residents and to
require arrangements for eliciting broad public participation. 5
Otherwise, the provisions of the Act are far from conclusive since
they generally call for only "maximum feasible" compliance with
particular provisions of the Act."
Ghetto residents could not exercise effective control over a
political CDC without having the power to remove a majority of its
directors from office. A majority of the participating residents
would presumably have the abstract power to influence at least
general policies. And, although the occasional influence of at least
some residents would be assured by the directors' needs to secure a
certain amount of constituent support, publics other than ghetto
residents might prove to be rival sources of power. 7
The political CDC would be most sensitive to the already
organized and sophisticated occupants of ghetto areas. It is not
clear, however, how or whether the politicial CDC could serve as
either an incentive to organization and participation or function
benevolently to benefit "unregistered" ghetto residents. 8 At least,
assuming that Subpart VII can operate and can be enforced as a
quasi-constitution, the political model is not clearly obnoxious to the
Act. However, giving CDCs an economic superstructure might be a
more obvious way of implementing the legislature's most pronounced
purposes.
163a62 (Smith-Hurd 1970); OHIO NON-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.37 (Baldwin 1971); PENNSYLVANIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION LAW, PA. STAT. ANN. §
7508 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79).
95. A mechanism for allowing "constituent" participation might be created,
analogous to those mechanisms established in organized political parties. Joseph
Schlesinger noted that party membership is an extremely loose concept, requiring no
participation beyond registering as a party member. In fact, affiliation with a party
may be entirely verbal. However, registered party members may take part in party
activities, run for office on a party ticket, attend conventions, vote in primaries and
take part in organizational decisions. Schlesinger, The Nucleus of Party Organization,
in A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PARTY ORGANIZATION 56-57 (W.E. Wright ed. 1971). See
also Kornberg, Party Organization in the Electorate, id at 508; Hennessy, On the
Study of Party Organization, APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF PARTY ORGANIZATION
16-17 (W.J. Crotty ed. 1968); and M. DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES 61 et seq. (1959).
96. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2982b (a) (12) (1976).
97. For example, the need to obtain refunding from the CSA may require
management to pursue policies different from those desired by constituents.
98. That is, those residents who have not met formal requirements as
specified by the CDC's certificates of incorporation or by-laws.
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B. The Economic Approach
The prominent features of Subpart VII indicate that Congress'
ambitions for community development were largely economic."
Though the amplified participation requirement suggests doubts
that investment alone could remedy underdevelopment, the par-
ticipation provision is compatible with the view that CDCs were
intended to operate as business enterprises. Public participation
would then build a kind of market research into CDC decision-
making, and increase the efficiency of entrepreneurial activities.
Further, by encouraging participation in the decision-making pro-
cess, the CDC programs may be more effectively implemented than
if the programs have to be "sold" after having been formally
adopted."M
An economic CDC can also accommodate both prospective and
retroactive participation by ghetto residents. First, information
elicited from ghetto residents during project selection may help to
disclose market demand for particular goods and services. Second,
both ghetto residents and non-residents can influence some cor-
porate decisions as consumers. Of course, CDCs may abstain from
profiting or sustain losses to subsidize specific goods, services, or
individuals; and all of the costs or benefits generated by a particular
venture cannot always be taken into account in assessing the worth
of its contribution to the community.1 Nonetheless, the economics
of investments and returns would dictate at least sporadic respon-
siveness to those residents with enough purchasing power to be
99. The Act authorizes programs designed to provide employment and owner-
ship opportunities, 42 U.S.C. § 2982 (1976); financial assistance may be provided by
CDC's aid to local businesses, 42 U.S.C. § 2982 (a) (1) (1976); create industrial parks, id.
at (2); and train the unemployed, i& at (3). The Director is authorized to make or
guarantee development loans to community economic development programs, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2984 (a) (1976), for which a development fund was established, id., at (c) and is also
authorized to establish a Model Community Economic Development Finance Corpora-
tion to provide long-term financing for CDCs. 42 U.S.C. § 2984a (1976).
100. See P. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRACTICES
(1974) (especially Ch. 10).
101. A particular project may be incapable of ever supporting itself but may at
the same time be indispensible to the success of beneficiary and dependent programs.
For instance, manpower training programs invest resources in developing skills that
will inure to the benefit of other businesses. The qualifications they impart may be
prerequisites to any employment. More importantly, however, bypassing training and
simply finding jobs for the unemployed is unlikely to create durable economic develop-
ment since unskilled workers are extremely vulnerable to mechanization and reces-
sions. See, e.g., Cromwell and Merrill, Minority Business Performance and the Com-
munity Development Corporations, 3 REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 65, 70 (1973).
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included in the relevant market. Insofar as the directors of economic
CDCs consistently miscalculate or ignore demand, they might impair
the CDC's capital structure, prompt termination or reduction of
federal funds or discourage private enterprises and foundations
from becoming involved in local development. Thus the accountability
of the economic CDC would be primarily extra-legal because the
model assumes that development, as a form of investment, is largely
a matter of managerial discretion."2
Some fiduciary standards, however, are undoubtedly applicable
to directors of CDCs. For example, the goal of ghetto development
and the purposes of CDCs might prompt the selection of directors
who are personally and financially involved in other competing ghetto
enterprises. In fact, Subpart VII specifically encourages the
presence of local businessmen and representatives from local finan-
cial institutions on CDC boards of directors. 3
The economic model is nevertheless defective insofar as the
histories of governments and free enterprise capitalism have per-
suaded Americans that expecting custodians of power to act respon-
sibly is not enough. It is often necessary to activate the idea of
responsibility by enforcing legal standards and obligations to par-
ticular individuals."' Further, the economic risks involved in achiev-
ing some social objectives discourage private sector solutions to
many social problems that occur in ghetto areas."5 The need to
integrate managerial expertise with other sources of authoritative
102. Proceeding upon the assumption that the best method for producing im-
proved conditions in ghetto areas is to pursue an intensely economic approach, those
persons chosen to implement this strategy must have a considerable amount of discre-
tion. Courts generally refuse to "second-guess" those who have made decisions which
are explicitly economic and reflect no indication of bad faith or self-dealing. See, e.g.,
Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942), where the court stated:
There are many matters disclosed by the record which cast doubt upon
the prudence, the wisdom, and the concern for the public interest shown
by these directors. We are constrained, however, to agree with the Ap-
pellate Division that there is little, if any, evidence to sustain a finding
that they have violated their trust or have failed to protect the interests
of the Empire Power Corporation according to the dictates of their judg-
ment, be that judgment good or bad.
Id. at 230, 43 N.E.2d at 21.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 2982b (a) (8) (1976).
104. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447 (1923). See also Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
105. See Marris, Galbraith, Solow and the Truth about Corporations, 11 THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 37 (Spring 1968).
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decisions is, however, a separate issue which has. been addressed
most explicitly in the area of administrative law.
C. The Administrative Approach
The Administrative approach to community development would
classify ghetto residents as analogues of the "aggrieved person"
who is eligible to participate in agency proceedings under the
Administrative Procedure Act.' Participation would typically follow
the notice and comment formula prescribed for rulemaking by
federal agencies." Consequently, opportunities to participate would
be primarily prospective and procedural. Decision-making officials
would be required to solicit public opinions, but could specify the
form and scope for comments, could be selective in allowing oral
presentations, and could rely solely upon their own expertise in
reaching final decisions."' 8
The Administrative approach would identify the CSA as the
only authentic federal agency involved in CDC decisions. CDCs
would operate as legally non-functional fronts for federal
administrative action. Citizen participation in CSA decisions would
be governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and
anyone satisfying judicially prescribed standing requirements 9 or
qualifying under the APA could appeal from final CSA decisions. Ar-
bitrary, capricious or incomprehensible decisions would be the prin-
cipal sources of appeals under federal law."0
Although conventional standing requirements would frequently
deny ghetto residents access to federal courts,"' CDCs would often
106. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (6) (c), (d) (1976).
108. See, e.g., Pacific Coast European Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d
197 (9th Cir. 1965), where the court said: "It is apparent that in rulemaking hearings
the purpose is to permit the agency to educate itself and not to allow interested par-
ties to choose the issues or narrow the scope of the proceedings. The purpose of the
notice is to allow interested parties to make useful comment and not to allow them to
assert their 'rights' to insist that the rule take a particular form. The agency, in
rulemaking, can look beyond the particular hearing record since it otherwise would be
unable to draw upon its expertise." Id at 205.
109. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974).
110. See Udall v. F.P.C., 387 U.S. 428 (1967); Cinderella Career and Finishing
Schools Inc. v. F.T.C., 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Pillsbury and Co. v. F.T.C., 354
F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966); City of Lawrence v. C.A.B., 343 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1965);
Kerner v. Fleming, 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960).
111. While ghetto residents, among others, would probably be considered
within the "zone of interest" protected by Title VII, Data Processing Service v. Camp,
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be capable of challenging CSA decisions. The legal remedies
available to individual ghetto residents would depend upon the pro-
visions of state corporation acts, in conjunction with state judicial
interpretations of Subpart VII.
A CSA-centered characterization of CDCs implies that Subpart
VII gives formal recognition to the needs of ghetto residents, but
reserves the tangible benefits for subsequent negotiation. Further,
the CSA's patterns of veto and approval could easily preempt local
initiatives. Yet the remote federal agency would neither be capable
of closely supervising CDCs nor subject to local pressures. As a
result the arrangement would expose the development process to a
variety of national influences and risk foreclosing routine respon-
sibility to those most affected by administrative actions.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The fact that different concepts of CDCs do yield different
policy decisions can be demonstrated by examining the opinion of
the only court that has resolved a dispute involving a CDC. The
court appears to have implied that CDCs are administrative agen-
cies for all purposes. In Corrugated Container Corp. v. Community
Services Administration,112 the plaintiff, a Virginia corporation,
engaged in the manufacture and distribution of corrugated paper
products, sued the Community Services Administration (CSA) for
permitting a Community Development Corporation to utilize federal
funds to finance a for-profit business which was in direct competi-
tion with the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked the court to enjoin the
defendant from disbursing additional funds to American Packaging
Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Southwest Virginia
Community Development Fund (SVCDF).
The facts which led to this controversy are as follows: In 1975
the SVCDF (a Subpart VII-funded CDC located in Roanoke, Virginia)
invested $500,000 in a wholly-owned, for-profit, corrugated box
manufacturing company, American Packaging Corporation. SVCDF
did not receive the approval of the CSA prior to making its invest-
ment because the CSA had accorded "venture autonomy" to SVCDF
and several other CDCs which empowered them to invest in
business ventures without prior CSA approval. At the time SVCDF
397 U.S. 150 (1970), they would only erratically satisfy the prerequisites of a personal
stake in a particular decision. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
112. 429 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Va. 1977).
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invested in American Packaging Corporation the corrugated box
industry showed a downward trend. Additionally, there was
evidence that currently operating corrugated box companies could
adequately supply all end-users within both metropolitan Roanoke
and a 100-mile radius of the city of Roanoke. Plaintiff corporation, a
manufacturer of corrugated paper products alleged that it would
suffer direct economic injury as a result of the newly-created cor-
rugated box manufacturer since the industry was highly competitive
and particularly since plaintiff and the CDC subsidiary were the on-
ly two corrugated box manufacturers located in the Roanoke Valley.
Secondly, plaintiff alleged that Subpart VII specifically protects
existing businesses in areas in which CDCs are located from unfair
competition. Finally, plaintiff alleged that the CSA failed to exercise
its statutorily defined obligation insofar as it illegally delegated to
SVCDF full power to make investment decisions by entering into
the venture autonomy agreement with SVCDF. The specific
statutory language upon which the plaintiff relied states:
The Director [of the CSAJ... shall not provide financial
assistance for any community development program . . .
unless he determines that ... the applicant is fulfilling or
will fulfill a need for services, supplies, or facilities which
is otherwise not being met; .... The program will not ...
result in the substitution of federal or other funds in con-
nection with work that would otherwise be performed."'
Plaintiff asked the court to enjoin the CSA from investing further
funds in or providing assistance to the CDC-subsidiary, American
Packaging Corporation.
After a careful review of the evidence presented by the parties
and the language of Subpart VII the court found that the CSA had
breached its statutory duty by entering into the venture autonomy
agreement with SVCDF, and had inflicted irreparable harm upon
the plaintiff for which there was no adequate remedy at law. It
stated:
[tjhere was an obvious Congressional intent . . . to
protect Corrugated, and others similarly situated, from
unfair competition from CSA-sponsored projects. The
language of this statute creates a positive duty on the
part of CSA to see that this Congressional intent is car-
ried out. Although CSA was intended to have a great deal
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2982 (b) (a) (5), (10) (1976).
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of discretion in the distribution of their allotted funds,
Congress did put certain very strict limitations on the
manner in which those funds could be distributed. 1 '
Sensitive to the facts that taxpayers' money was used to
establish American Packaging Corporation and that this corporation
was a going concern with paid employees, the court ordered the
CSA to refrain from spending, or authorizing SVCDF to spend any
Subpart VII funds "to support competition with enterprises such as
Corrugated.""' Further, the court ordered the CSA to refrain from
entering into any further venture antonomy agreements with
SVCDF.
One of the interesting aspects of the case is the status the
court accorded the CDC. In discussing its remedy the court stated:
"SVCDF appears to have no interests separable from those of the
CSA and APC which might be affected by any relief granted here,
because SVCDF has acted solely as a medium for funneling CSA
funds to APC."". This view of SVCDF's role seems hard to reconcile
with the provision of Subpart VII which states that ownership of
projects undertaken by the CDC with federal funds shall vest in the
CDC, 7 unless the court views the CDC as simply an extension of
the CSA. There is additional language in the opinion which suggests
that the court does take this view of CDCs. In discussing the actions
which the CSA and the CDC can take consonant with its decree the
court stated: "SVCDF can continue to function as a disbursing agen-
cy consistent with those statutory limitations and the finding that
the funding of APC conflicts with the Act.""1 8
Consequently, the case raises the issue of what legal effect
should be given to the complexity of Subpart VII. As previously
shown the complexity consists of several dimensions which, on some
levels, are mutually exclusive."9 However, another way of examining
this issue is to discuss the possible precedential effect of Cor-
rugated.
114. 429 F. Supp. 142, 152 (W.D. Va. 1977).
115. Id at 154.
116. Id (emphasis added). APC, referred to by the court, is the American
Packaging Corporation, the wholly-owned subsidiary of Southwest Virginia Community
Development Fund.
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 2982 (c) (2) (1976).
118. 429 F. Supp. 142, 154 (W.D. Va. 1977).
119. See text supra, at 54-61.
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POSSIBLE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECTS OF CORRUGATED CONTAINER
The Corrugated Container case could provide the basis for a
definition of CDCs as administrative agencies that could be accepted
as literally true for all purposes. That is, CDCs could be construed
as administrative agencies irrespective of the fact pattern of the
dispute. But, this view of CDCs may deplete the relationship be-
tween area residents and CDCs of possibilities that other views
preserve. The implications of the court's view of CDCs becomes visi-
ble when CDCs are viewed in the context of past experience, as ex-
pressed in related social institutions.
The array of institutions that have developed in America to
hold and manage resources on behalf of various segments of the
public, and for different purposes, provides a context for evaluating
the consequences of giving the relationship between CDCs and area
residents an entirely administrative character. That is, appreciating
the kind of choices that CDCs comprise and reflect requires a com-
parison of CDCs to other related organizations that could have been
selected to serve the purpose and achieve the objectives articulated
in Subpart VII. The range of organizations that are at least
theoretical alternatives to the CDC-CSA arrangement extends from
administrative agencies and charitable trusts to large for-profit cor-
porations.
All of these related organizations collectively reflect two inter-
related social values or preferences which make the relationship
between them a reflection of political predisposition. First, they
display a relative resistance to government control over social and
economic activities. Second, they express the notion that people
should be able to influence decisions that affect their lives. The
reluctance to vest comprehensive power in a central government ap-
pears to be part of a larger aversion to self contained decisions
which can afford not to be responsive to popular demands or public
needs; large concentrations of economic power as possessed by
monopolists are similarly suspect. The preference for individual par-
ticipation in decision-making reinforces the principle of responsive
governance or management and also contributes to the
resourcefulness of the system and its capacity for innovation. In
practice, these preferences dictate that the nation's future will be
largely or partially composed of individual decisions rather than a
product of centralized planning. Indeed, little of this nation's ex-
perience is informative on the question of what standards of accoun-
tability are appropriate or applicable to the administration of a plan
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that prefabricates part of the future of particular areas by per-
manently vesting resources in selected institutions.
The legal relationship between the constituents of particular
types of organizations and those who administer, direct or manage
them is ultimately reduced to the issue of standing to challenge cer-
tain decisions in courts of law, or eligibility to bring individual,
representative and derivative actions, and rights to select manage-
ment, receive information and participate in decision-making. Thus,
the legal relationship is ordinarily discussed in terms of statutory
obligations, property or ownership interests, fiduciary duties, and
due process.1" The contents of these terms, however, often overlap
and are occasionally interchangeable. 21 In concrete terms, each of
the sources of standing serves to recognize some kind of "invest-
ment" of interested persons in the outcome of specific decision-
making processes."
It seems likely that the federal and state governments would
be more deeply involved in social welfare activities if not for tax
120. An unincorporated non-profit association consists of a group of persons
who have come together for some non-profit purpose. The rights and obligations of the
association are the cumulative rights and obligations of its members, Association
property is deemed held by individual members. While the association's managers are
fiduciaries vis-a-vis the association, there is usually no fiduciary relationship among
members. See generally Oleck, Non-Profit Unincorporated Associations, 21 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 44 (1972). See also Henn and Pfeifer, Non-profit Groups: Factors Influen-
cing Choice of Form, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 181, 187-197 (1975).
The relationship between charitable trusts and their trustees, beneficiaries and
settlors is controlled by trust indentures and trust law. The title to trust property is
vested in the trustees for the benefit of unnamed beneficiaries; and the trustee manag-
ing such assets is subject to traditional fiduciary standards. See generally Freemont-
Smith, Duties and Powers of Charitable Fiduciaries: The Law of Trusts and the Cor-
rection of Abuses, 13 UCLA L. REV. 1041 (1966). See also Henn and Pfeifer, supra at
197-206.
The non-profit corporation is a state-sanctioned entity distinct from its members.
Management stands in a fiduciary relationship with the corporation and is answerable
to the corporation, attorney general or individual members when their rights are
violated. Corporate assets are held in the name of the corporation and their disposition
is determined by state law, the articles of incorporation, and the will of the members.
See Henn and Pfeifer, supra, at 206-214.
121. See e.g., Pearlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
122. It should be noted that the concept of investment has somewhat wider
currency than the word usually enjoys as a description of ownership interests. For
example, expectations alone can amount to property interests when properly founded.
See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3rd Cir. 1947); New York Trust Co.,
Trustee v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y. 209, 155 N.E. 102 (1922). Consequently, what
the concept of investment describes is not so much financial commitment as trust. See,
e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 240 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
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exempt non-profit corporations and trusts. These organizations cur-
rently engage in the private management of resources for the public
good, and thereby contribute to the general diffusion of decision-
making power which could easily concentrate in governmental
departments and agencies."= The purposes of such organizations
have been limited and certified in advance so that as long as a
"charitable" organization adheres to its purposes there is an
assurance or presumption that it is responding to a genuine need
and producing a social benefit.12 In relation to activities that pro-
mote the general welfare, individual interests are virtually irrele-
vant.
Specifically, public and private reversionary interests in
charitable trusts are quite narrow and often cannot be asserted
without the assistance of the State Attorney General. Even the
beneficiaries of a trust cannot contest matters pertaining to its
general administration."= Similarly, in most jurisdictions the power
to exercise continuing supervision over non-profit corporations
resides in either the Secretary of State or the State Attorney
General."" In contrast, shareholders of large publicly owned corpora-
tions can activate individual, corporate or collective interests in a
variety of ways and can contest a wide range of decisions under the
proper circumstances.'
123. See generally G. McConnell, The Public Values of the Private Associa-
tion, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION 147-69 (Pennock and Chapman eds. 1969).
124. Id See also N. OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS
(1956).
125. While a beneficiary may sue to protect the purpose of the trust, and may
bring suit for advice of the court as to interpretation of the trust instrument, "aid of
the court may not be invoked to settle business problems or to advise the trustees
how to use their discretionary powers." BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 153, p. 554 (1973).
126. See The Status of State Regulations of Charitable Trusts, Foundations,
and Solicitations in RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE
PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, Vol. 5, p. 2704 (1977); Note, Membership Rights in
Nonprofit Corporations: A Need for Increased Legal Recognition and Protection, 29
VAND. L. REV. 747, 768 (1976).
127. Shareholders have the right to determine who shall be the corporate
policymakers; vote on matters which affect the fundamental nature of the corporation
(mergers, acquisitions, sale of substantially all of the assets, dissolution); sue the cor-
poration and sue on behalf of the corporation; seek appraisal rights; vote to amend the
certificate of incorporation and by-laws. See, e.g., Medical Committee for Human
Rights v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (propriety
of manfacturing napalm); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlon, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953)
(legality of giving corporate funds to a private university); Sylvia Martin Foundation
Inc. v. Swearing, 260 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (legality of floating bond issue out-
side of the United States).
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In contrast, the opportunity to affect the decisions of ad-
ministrative agencies is provided by routine opportunities for par-
ticipation in decision-making and judicial review. 28 Standing to seek
judicial review of administrative action does not attach to a definite
status but rather depends upon the circumstances of particular
cases. Judicial review rarely reaches substantive issues and most
often addresses the procedural dimensions of decision-making." The
attention to process reflects several significant features of ad-
ministrative agencies. First, agencies often operate in areas where
the criteria of action are uncertain and there is no measure of cor-
rectness. Courts often recognize these conditions under the rubric of
expertise."3 Second, the statutes that give life to agencies often give
symbolic rewards to an identified constituency and reserve tangible
benefits for subsequent negotiation. Hence, in the context of ad-
ministrative agencies, the difference between due process and
democratic process becomes indistinct, verifying DeTocqueville's
observation that "scarcely any political question arises in the United
States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial
question."'' 1
In the light of principles that are ordinarily important to the
operation of organizations that make decisions on behalf of others,
CDCs indeed appear to be somewhat anomalous. That is, their rela-
tionship to more conventional corporations, trusts and ad-
ministrative agencies is more of a family resemblance than a logical
connection."2
128. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Scenic Hudson Preserva-
tion Conference v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965); Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also, Albert, Stan-
ding to Challenge Administrative Actions: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claims for
Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Gelhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Pro-
ceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972).
129. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134 (1974); Escalera v. New York Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
130. "Congress was very deliberate in adopting this standard of review. It
frees the reviewing courts of the time-consuming and difficult task of weighing the
evidence, it gives proper respect to the expertise of the administrative tribunal and it
helps promote the uniform application of the statute." Consolo v. F.M.C., 383 U.S. 607,
620 (1966). See also, NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292
(1939); NLRB v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942).
131. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Vintage Books ed. 1945).
132. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 65-67 (G. Anscombe
trans. 1967).
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First, members or shareholders of CDCs cannot sell their in-
terests, insulate themselves from CDC activities, or easily remove
themselves from a CDC's jurisdiction. The absence of a market and
the rather monopolistic position of CDCs that results from the in-
ability of many residents to "take their businesses elsewhere"
makes it difficult to determine whether the needs that CDCs ad-
dress accord with residents' self-defined interests.1" Second, the
scope of Subpart VII permits the management of CDCs to change
the character of the enterprise without the assent of area
residents."M Finally, even control over a CDC would not give them
the power to choose its activities from among those authorized by
the statute."3 The CSA's powers limit the abilities of residents or
management to implement the objectives that they prefer, and it
(CSA) exists as an anonymous super board of directors which can
ratify or veto corporate decisions. The CSA can give decisive weight
to the interests of those outside underdeveloped areas or to
minorities within the constituency of CDCs.
If the development program outlined in Subpart VII was im-
plemented either entirely through corporations not subject to CSA
vetos, or exclusively by the CSA, the rights of area residents would
at least be clearer than they are at the present time. CDCs,
133. Even when there is more than one CDC in a particular city, each is
located in a separate, clearly marked geographical area. For example, there are three
CDCs located in New York City; however, one is located in Harlem, one in Bedford-
Stuyvesant and one in the South Bronx. While there is no statutory or regulatory pro-
hibition against more than one CDC in a particular geographical area, the fact is that
each of the existing urban CDCs are located in separate areas throughout the country.
134. A CDC which has invested all or substantially all of its funds in business
enterprises may, through a simple majority vote of its board of directors, decide to
rechannel all or substantially all of its assets into housing or property acquisition. This,
of course, does not necessarily imply that the action taken would be in contravention
of state law. Presumably, the board of General Motors, by a simple majority vote,
could discontinue the manufacture of automobiles and introduce a new pet food.
However, the perceived adverse economic consequences of such action are significantly
greater in the case of GM than in the case of CDCs.
135. Because of the CSA's power to veto investment decisions made by CDCs
it is conceivable that even unanimous shareholder or membership approval may be
inadequate to effectuate a change in corporate policy. If, however, CDCs were govern-
ed solely by state corporation statutes, shareholder approval of fundamental changes
in the corporations' activities would suffice. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. X § 271 (re-
quires majority shareholder vote for sale of all or substantially all of a corporation's
assets). Additionally, state corporation law is far more permissive with regard to
eligibility to become a member of the board of directors. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
IV, § 141 (no eligibility requirements for directors of for-profit corporations) with 42
U.S.C. § 2982b (a) (1) (1976) (requires all federally funded CDCs to have a board of direc-
tors, fifty percent of whom must be residents of the area in which the CDC is located).
1978] COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 69
however, represent a merier of the two formats. Thus, the legal
position of residents is at best ambiguous and at worse non-existent.
Consequently, before defining the relevance of past experience to
contemporary CDCs, it is necessary to analyze the concrete advan-
tages and disadvantages that adhere to interpreting Corrugated
Cardboard v. CSA"8' as precedent for the position that CDCs should
be viewed, for all purposes, as administrative agencies.
Advantages of Viewing CDCs As Administrative Agencies
Viewing Corrugated Cardboard v. CSA as a precedent that
defines CDCs as mere administrative extensions of the CSA would
give clarity, or at least familiarity, to the decision-making arrange-
ment established by Subpart VII. Further, the resulting emphasis
upon procedure would give sophisticated non-residents and residents
of underdeveloped areas opportunities to challenge procedural ir-
regularities and possibly substantive decisions.' These oppor-
tunities for involvement are significant insofar as they permit, and
perhaps encourage, expressions of dissatisfaction before they
disrupt the development process. Particularly with regard to non-
residents, the thoroughly administrative view of CDCs might in the
long run help to maintain a larger political constituency for social
change than would otherwise be available. Finally, although ad-
ministrative decision-making is certainly vulnerable to a variety of
obstructions and delays when practiced in commercial areas, it is
unclear that the residents of underdeveloped areas are capable of
acting as the counterparts of those who are accused of co-opting or
obstructing the actions of the principal federal agencies. 8 That is,
136. 429 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Va. 1977).
137. Clearly, area residents would be in a position to seek judicial review of
CSA actions if these actions arguably affected them personally or affected their im-
mediate living or possibly working environment. The Administrative Procedure Act
provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is en-
titled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). Of course, the above provision
of the A.P.A. would also be available to non-residents. Further, the courts have held
that one has standing to challenge agency action including action which violates in-
terests protected by statute as well as the common law. See, e.g., Alton R.R. v. United
States, 315 U.S. 15 (1942); F.C.C. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Stn., 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Na-
tional Coal Ass'n v. F.P.C., 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
138. See 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 11-14 (1971); Green &
Nader, Economic Regulation v. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE
L.J. 871 (1973); Noll, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 57 VA. L. REV. 1016
(1971); Jaffe, Federal Regulation Agencies in Perspective: Administrative Limitations
in a Political Setting, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 565 (1970); Reich, The New Proper-
ty, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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logistically, the task of sustaining a degree of influence over ad-
ministrative actions seems to require levels of money, mobility and
monitoring that might be impossible for the urban poor.1'" Conse-
quently, the application of technology and expertise to the problems
of the low-income communities might be relatively unimpeded by
countervailing conditions.
Disadvantages of Viewing CDCs As Administrative Agencies
Although a thoroughly administrative view of CDCs would help
to achieve a degree of conceptual clarity and efficiency, the disad-
vantages of such a view may, in the long run, outweigh those advan-
tages. Conceptually, combining CDCs and the CSA into a single ad-
ministrative unit cancels out any corporate dimension that CDCs
might have and thereby invites the problems inherent in centralized
planning as opposed to more diffuse decision-making systems. The
practical disadvantages that adhere to completely administrative
characterization follow largely from the fact that some advantages
are obtained only by superceding what were once community con-
trolled corporations" ° with a bureaucratic structure that is probably
less responsive to area residents. For example, the rigidity that can
afflict an agency preoccupied with its own survival is especially cost-
ly when the agency is assigned objectives that entail uncertainties
and call for innovation. Further, even if area residents are not in a
position to disable the CSA, non-residents may be able to do so
without difficulty.
The problems of an inaccessible decision-making procedure can
only be compounded as the process becomes less visible to the
public that it affects and as the problem to be solved, and the public
to be served, become less visible to decision-makers. The
remoteness of the CSA as a centralized planning agency would very
likely impede the flow of information that is necessary for sound
decisions. Under such circumstances, assumptions, ideology, and in-
stitutional self-interest are likely to play an inordinant role in plan-
ning. For example, material differences between various
underdeveloped areas that are observable at the local level may not
be recognizable by a remote agency.
The real world disadvantages that result from treating CDCs
as administrative agencies for all purposes are severe and could
139. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1685 (1975); Bonfield, Representation for the Poor in Federal
Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REV. 511 (1969).
140. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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substantially undermine the development process. The opinion in
Corrugated Container does not seem to adequately account for the
role of CDCs as social mediating institutions and components in a
larger legal system. Sensitivity to the difficult accommodations that
must be made between CDCs and the local community and the
larger society necessitates an examination of factors not considered
by the court in Corrugated Container.
ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF CDCs
An alternative approach to the foregoing interpretation of the
role of CDCs under Subpart VII raises the issue of whether CDCs
should be differently defined to accomodate and resolve conflicts
among area residents. It also invites the question of whether the dif-
fusion of decision-making authority that would result from a recogni-
tion of the non-administrative aspects of CDCs would be more
responsive to the statute and the complexities of the decision-
making process.
Treating decision-making under Subpart VII partially as a pro-
cess of resolving conflicts among area residents would require for-
malizing the relationship between CDCs and area residents. Such
treatment may also increase the susceptibility of CDCs to legal
challenges, and might create managerial uncertainties. For example,
seemingly objective and rational standards, such as profit maximiza-
tion, cannot serve as the sole selection criterion or justification for
one of several alternative courses of action if area residents are in a
position to stymie effective implementation of a plan or challenge it
in court.
Further, the confusion and complications that would result
from formalizing the legal relationship between CDCs and area
residents would certainly be costly and it is unclear that the oppor-
tunities for involvement would offer anything tangible or valuable to
area residents. That is, the assumption that area residents want
some control over decisions that affect their lives is speculative.
But, this assumption is no more speculative than the assumption
that the allocation of funds to substantive programs is of higher
priority to those who live in underdeveloped areas than the expen-
diture of funds for holding meetings and requiring disclosures.
However, exploiting the relationship between CDCs and area
residents would also yield some desirable results, as an interpreta-
tion of the statute and as a format for development. And, unless
CDCs are more precisely defined, and the appropriate legal relation-
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ship between CDCs and area residents articulated, many of the dif-
ficult policy questions relating to their capacity to function as
agents of social change in underdeveloped areas will remain
unanswered. For instance, the appropriate level of federal in-
terference in CDC activities will remain unclear unless the rights of
community residents are more sharply defined. Until restraints on
the CSA's veto are developed and reviewed, CSA participation
threatens preemption of CDC responsibility to area residents.
Moreover, CDCs' uncertain character, combined with govern-
ment sponsorship and inevitable inabilities to deliver anticipated
good results when expected, expose CDCs to criticism from all sides.
Placing CDCs in a vulnerable political position would reduce their
chance of attaining enough institutional legitimacy to operate effec-
tively."'
Further, developing a clearer concept of the role of CDCs
would assist in analyzing the concrete choices that continually con-
front CDC managers. Even mundane management and investment
decisions cannot be separated from the larger issue of goal defini-
tion. Questions of constituency must also be faced by each CDC no
matter what goal cluster it selects. For example, CDCs commonly
face the choice between housing restoration, which benefits
homeowners and occupants, and new construction, which increases
the opportunities for home ownership. Decisions about rent levels
and the amount and terms of mortgages to be made available also
function to select certain area residents for favorable treatment
from the greater number of people who are eligible for benefit.
Even routine decisions, like selecting locations for a business ven-
ture, will tend to favor some residents and penalize others.
Of course, it is not clear that CDCs should be "clarified" or
characterized in a way that makes them routinely responsive to
selected constituencies. Some ghetto residents will always be better
141. See H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1961), p. xxiv; see also J.
MARCH AND H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 140-41, 169 (1958); MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY 196-204, (G. Mills ed. 1946). Perhaps the paradigmatic example of organiza-
tions which appeared unable to resolve the need to establish legitimacy among ghetto
residents and city officials were Community Action Agencies established pursuant to
Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Community Action Agencies that
became independent of local, state or federal governments were frequently debilitated
or discontinued. Those that failed to assert independence were often discredited in
their communities and were therefore ineffective. See S. LEVITAN, THE GREAT
SOCIETY'S POOR LAWS 124 (1969); P. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING
(1970); Levitan, The Community Action Program: A Strategy to Fight Poverty, 385
POL. SCIENCES ANNALS 63, 68 (1969).
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economic risks than others and some will undoubtedly remain more
politically sophisticated and more effectively organized than others.
Conceptual clarity should not be achieved at the cost of committing
CDCs to isolated interests.
Legislators also face policy dilemmas that are difficult to ad-
dress without a conceptual approach to, if not a coherent theory of,
CDCs. For example, without more information than it presently has
the CSA cannot possibly know whether a single CDC can accomplish
the objectives articulated in Subpart VII in a given geographical
area. Further, Congress must decide what financial investment to
make in CDCs as opposed to other anti-proverty strategies.
Calculating the optimal level of funds for each program would re-
quire information about the relative effectiveness of different pro-
grams.
Finally, as development proceeds more area residents will un-
doubtedly become interested in CDC activities. This will probably
result in conflicts over CDC operations and priorities. "' Increased in-
volvement will, however, probably consist only of the more organiz-
ed while the least sophisticated residents, who may most need the
benefits which a CDC could produce, will probably have the least in-
fluence in determining the outcome of CDC decisions.' Some
method must therefore be developed that not only more precisely
defines CDCs and their legal relationship to area residents but also
protects minority interests. It is precisely at this point that the doc-
trines and theories of corporate law may prove useful.
RELEVANCE OF CORPORATE THEORY TO CDCs
CDCs are corporations and a corporation is a legal device that
implicitly comprehends the possibilities of civilized conflict resolu-
142. According to Simon Kuzenets, economic development depends upon
minimal political stability and requires a means of expressing the conflicts of interest
that inevitably arise in the course of economic change so that constraints upon further
economic growth can be minimized. S. KUZENETS. MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH 481
(1960); see also L.W. PYE, ASPECTS OF POLITICAL DEVLOPMENT (1966); G. ALMOND AND S.
VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS
(1963).
143. [Tihe most active participants in community groups are not the
poorest people in their communities; they tend to be upward mobile peo-
ple, with middle-class (economic) expectations, who can invest in issues
other than the daily struggle for sheer survival that plagues and drains
the energies and perspectives of the very poor.
I. Laear, Which Citizens To Participate In What? in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - A CASE
BOOK IN DEMOCRACY 278, 285 (E. Cahn and B. Passett eds. 1970).
144. See, e.g., Application of Vogel, 25 App. Div. 2d 212, 268 N.Y.S.2d 237
(1966), affd, 19 N.Y.2d 589, 278 N.Y.S.2d 236, 224 N.E.2d 738 (1967).
74 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.13
tion.'" Consequently, it is possible that residents of underdeveloped
areas can improve their communities through the use of the cor-
porate form if the corporation is not crippled by federal regulation
or completely controlled by a powerful and articulate minority
within the community. Therefore, the question is, how these locally
operated corporations, which attempt to maximize multiple and at
time inconsistent objectives, can be given the autonomy of corpora-
tions engaged in economic activities and the flexibility of charitable
corporations, while being held accountable to federal and state
governments and to area residents.
Suggested Amendment to Subpart VII
Perhaps the best means of accomplishing the aforementioned
objective is a Congressional amendment to Subpart VII which would
simultaneously increase the autonomy of CDCs and their accoun-
tability to area residents. The objective of such an amendment
would be to clarify the legal position of CDC managers and the legal
position of area residents in relation to the CDC.
The autonomy of CDCs could be increased by removing the
CSA's veto power over CDC investment decisions and permitting
them to exercise greater internal control. Removing the CSA's veto
power would permit CDC officers and directors to make decisions
more quickly and efficiently and, equally important, would increase
their responsibility to area residents."5 The fact that most of the
operating and investment funds of CDCs come from the federal
government for certain specified purposes means that Congress has
responsibility for closely monitoring CDC activities. To fulfill this
responsibility Congress could establish or authorize the CSA to
establish a reporting system similar to that currently used by the
Securities and Exchange Commission to monitor the activities of
publicly held corporations.""' That is, CDCs could be required to file
145. Although CDC directors are currently accountable to area residents who
are shareholders or members of the CDC, there is at least the possibility that these
directors can attempt to rationalize both the types of decisions made on the theory
that these decisions are likely to be approved by the CSA, as well as the delay in im-
plementing decisions on the theory that the delay was created by the CSA. Removing
the CSA's veto power would also eliminate the availability of these justifications for
particular decisions and sluggish implementation.
146. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires a registered company
to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.), "such annual reports ...
and such quarterly reports . . . as the Commission may prescribe." 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1970).
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periodic reports, and perhaps pre-acquisition reports"7 with the CSA
to provide some assurance that federal funds were not being used to
compete with unsubsidized private enterprises or for purposes clearly
beyond the scope of Subpart VII." '5
Nevertheless, increasing the autonomy of CDC management
without expanding the role of area residents would create the very
real possibility that CDCs would become the fiefdom of a small, well-
organized group of area residents. Congress could, however, attempt
to insure CDC accountability to a larger constituency by requiring
that membership in CDCs be open to all adult persons who reside in
the area designated by the CDC as the geographical area which it
serves. This may, however, be only an apparent and not realistic
solution. The majority of the federally funded CDCs are non-profit
corporations and legal rights which attach to memberships in non-
profit corporations in most of the jurisdictions in which CDCs are
located are not as extensive as those possessed by shareholders in
for-profit corporations. For example, the principal enforcement
mechanism in most of these jurisdictions is an action by either the
Attorney General or by any member or director of the corporation
to dissolve the corporation. 9 Obviously, this is the last mechanism
147. By pre-acquisition reports is simply meant reports which would contain the
same information which the CSA required from those CDCs that had entered into a
venture autonomy agreement prior to Corrugated. The filing requirements for CDCs
that had venture autonomy were spelled out by the court in Corrugated: "If a com-
munity development corporation has been awarded venture autonomy, then all that it
is required to do before investing the grant funds in a venture is to file a feasibility
study with CSA. This study must be filed at least twenty (20) days prior to the im-
plementation of the venture." 429 F. Supp. 142, 145 (W.D. Va. 1977).
148. Since the scope of permissible activities in which CDCs can engage is so
broad, it may be difficult for the CSA to rule that any proposed CDC activity or
acquisition is clearly beyond the scope of Subpart VII; however, if negotiation between
the CSA and the CDC proved unsuccessful the CDC could always resort to the courts
by treating the CSA's adverse ruling as a final order. See Medical Committee for
Human Rights v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n., 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
149. In nine of the twelve jurisdictions in which CDCs are located, the relevant
statutes are based on the ABA-ALI MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT: These
jurisdictions are Colorado, District of Columbia, Illinois, Missouri, North Carolina,
Ohio, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The principal enforcement mechanisms in the
Model Act are actions to dissolve the corporation. These actions may be brought by
either the Attorney General or by any member or director. The Attorney General may
act if the charter was procured by fraud, if the corporation abuses its authority, if it
answers official inquiries falsely, or if it fails to conform to various filing requirements.
Members or directors can act when the board of trustees is deadlocked, when illegal or
oppressive acts are being performed, when the corporation's assets are being wasted,
or when the corporation is unable to carry out its purposes. The more useful remedy
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which members of CDCs would utilize to discipline management,
assuming the availability of less drastic alternatives. Congress
should therefore incorporate into Subpart VII certain provisions of
state business corporation statutes or, alternatively, incorporate
provisions of a more recently enacted state not-for-profit corporation
statute, such as New York's, which gives members of a non-profit
corporation substantially the same rights as shareholders of a
business corporation.'O More specifically, the congressional amend-
ment should specify that all adult residents of communities in which
CDCs are located are members of the CDC. Further, it should pro-
vide that all members of CDCs have a legal right to sue derivatively
on behalf of the CDC, vote by proxy, and receive annual, and
perhaps quarterly, reports from the CDC.
The inclusiveness of local membership in CDCs under the pro-
posed amendment is desirable because of the scope of Subpart VII,
the intention of CDC founders that they be controlled by community
residents and the low-income status of most residents affected by
CDC activities. Unlike middle-income communities where many
residents either participate directly or rely upon others to represent
their interests in numerous organizations, most residents of urban
underdeveloped communities are constantly engaged in the struggle
for survival and therefore cannot afford the luxury of joining and
participating in organizations which shape the social, political and
economic life of their communities. Nevertheless, they probably
have an interest in their communities which could be analogized to
the interest of investors or stockholders in companies in which they
own stock."' The fact that the stockholder in a publicly-held corpora-
of a derivative suit is not mentioned in the Model Act, and there are no cases authoriz-
ing this remedy in these jurisdictions.
As far as internal controls are concerned, the Model Act provides for the
removal of directors by any procedure provided in the articles of incorporation or the
bylaws, or by a meeting called expressly for that purpose.
150. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 601 et. seq. (McKinney 1970).
151. Generally, the primary interest of an investor who holds stock in a large
publicly-held corporation is not in exercising his legal rights as a shareholder to
discipline or challenge managerial decisions. His primary interest is in his investment
and to that end his main concern is the profitability of the corporation and whether he
is receiving an acceptable return on his investment. See, e.g., LIVINGSTON, THE
AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 26 (1958). Similarly, it is probably true that the average resi-
dent of an urban underdeveloped community has little interest in disciplining or
challenging decisions of CDC managers, assuming that he is even aware of the CDC's
existence. His primary interest in CDC activities is probably more personalized. That
is, he is probably more concerned with receiving a "dividend" in the form of enhanced
job opportunities for himself and his family and improved services within the communi-
ty and more particularly the neighborhood in which he lives.
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tion has paid some consideration for his stock is not necessarily fatal
to the analogy. First, as was shown earlier, many area residents par-
ticipated in the formation and development of some urban CDCs and
therefore, contributed some form of capital to the CDC." Secondly,
in an obviously redistribution orientated federal program it is not
impermissible for Congress to distribute cash to an organization and
the power to control that organization to the intended beneficiaries.
Further support for the analogy lies in the fact that the managers of
a corporation control the financial future of their investors, at least
that portion of the investor's capital which is in the company.1" In
exchange for the discretion to utilize this capital to produce some
type of-product, and hopefully give the investor a return on his
capital, corporate managers incur the risk of being dismissed,
removed from office, sued, and the ultimate prospect that the
shareholders will sell to others interested in taking over the firm
and replacing management.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that CDC area
residents should enjoy the same degree of control over CDC direc-
tors as do shareholders in publicly held corporations. Managers of
CDCs are given money by the government and instructed to create
viable economic and social institutions in the community which will
become a permanent part of the community's assets. Thus they
should be held to the same level of accountability to local residents
as are managers of for-profit corporations."
The suggestion that area residents be accorded the status of de
facto shareholders in non-profit corporations raises several troubling
152. See text supra, at note 5.
153. Until and unless the investor decides to sell his securities, the capital
which he has invested in the corporation is controlled by corporate managers and
beyond the reach of the investor. If the corporate managers perform well, the financial
future of the investor is enhanced by the growth of his securities and vice versa.
154. Another significant feature of the non-profit corporation is the
nature of shareholder ownership. The shares of large profit-making cor-
porations are generally valuable assets on which money can be realized
by transferring them to another owner. Also the value of the shares rises
and falls according to the diverse economic factors present in the
securities markets. In non-profit organizations, however, the cost of a unit
of ownership is generally fixed by the corporation rather than by the
market, and often transfers of shares for money or other consideration is
statutorily prohibited. The end result is that shares in profit-making cor-
porations are generally held for investment purposes, while those in non-
profit organizations are held because there is some external benefit to be
derived from the membership itself-such as community development.
Phemister and Hildebrand, The Use of Non-Profit Corporations and Cooperatives for
Ghetto Economic Development, 48 J. URBAN LAW 181, 200 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
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issues. First, why not require CDCs to incorporate under state law
as for-profit corporations? Perhaps the best answer is that the non-
profit form provides more flexibility when the multiple goals of
CDCs are taken into account."l Additionally, the loss of tax-
exemption under federal law is a persuasive response.1" Moreover,
if most residents of urban underdeveloped communities are too
preoccupied with survival to actively participate in community
organizations how will an amendment to Subpart VII which accords
de facto shareholder status to these residents insure greater
managerial accountability? The short answer is that we simply do
not know that it will.
A more equivocal response, however, is that if the CDC
managers are required to supply fairly accurate information on a
regular basis to community residents some of these residents will
read and understand these corporate reports and on some occasions
may be moved to take some form of action against CDC managers or
against others on behalf of the CDC.'57 To enhance their chance of
success these residents may seek the support of other residents
with similar interests or concerns. Even short of taking action,
however, the more sophisticated residents who read CDC reports
could serve a type of brokerage function by conveying the informa-
tion contained in the reports to other community residents in clear
and intelligible form. This may cause the recipients to take some ac-
155. It is difficult, if not impossible, to define profit maximization or to ascer-
tain when the directors are acting in the best interest of the "shareholders" when the
corporation is attempting to maximize multiple goals rather than a single goal. The
non-profit form permits CDC directors to simultaneously pursue economic and social
objectives.
156. All federally-funded urban non-profit CDCs have received tax exemption
under § 501 (c) (3) of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.
157. This does not necessarily suggest that the action will involve litigation,
although on occasions it may. There are other forms of action which could be taken by
CDC de facto shareholders. Based upon the information contained in the annual
reports, these shareholders could evaluate the performance of management negatively
and decide to vote against the management slate at the next election; they could
decide to attend the next board meeting and lodge a formal complaint about some
aspect of the management and direction of the CDC, and as suggested above, they may
find some basis for instituting a lawsuit. For example, suppose the annual report show-
ed that the corporation owned a business which was located in a building owned by
one of the board members, and that the rent paid by the business was substantially
more than that paid for comparable commercial space in that area. A de facto
shareholder could conceivably institute a lawsuit on behalf of the CDC for breach of
fiduciary obligation. The hypothetical posed above was taken from a report of a con-
flict of interest by an operating CDC. For other examples of such conflicts, see Hear-
ings, supra note 57, at 512.
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tion to protect their interests or the interests of the CDC." Finally,
the de facto shareholder status of area residents would facilitate a
discrete form of resident participation in CDC decision-making.
Assuming that some area residents would occasionally exercise their
shareholder status and contest some corporate decisions, it is
untenable to suppose that the directors of CDCs could completely ig-
nore the possibility of legal opposition to their decisions. It is more
likely that directors would begin to evaluate the likelihood that par-
ticular decisions would generate litigation, and to assess the pro-
bability that hypothetical plaintiffs would survive summary judg-
ment motions and prevail on the merits of their complaints. The
presence of "phantom plaintiffs" in the decision-making process
would, in effect, transform some uninvolved area residents into par-
ticipants and would secure a place in CDC deliberations for mute
and minority interests.
Even if the de facto shareholder concept is analytically sound,
the question of whether it should be encouraged depends upon the
benefits that it would bring to underdeveloped areas, and its sound-
ness as a method of implementing Subpart VII. The proposal has the
virtue of equating participation by area residents in CDCs with par-
ticipation by other investors in corporate decisions. 59 The conse-
quence may be to allow interests and concerns in the ghetto to sur-
face and be resolved through normal corporate channels rather than
arbitrated by officials who may be preoccupied with institutional
prejudices or self-interest.
American corporate experience demonstrates that oppor-
tunities for legal opposition can organize and activate interests that
158. The analogy with the investor who holds a few shares of stock in a
publicly-held corporation is appropriate. Aside from financial reporting services, such
as stock market quotations and other financial reporting in the daily newspapers, the
average investor probably relies upon his stock broker for information about the com-
pany whose shares he owns. "The most important source of external information to the
securities research process appears to be the financial statements of issuers ....
Direct contact with security issuers ranks next, followed by information received from
other research organizations ...... INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SUMMARY VOLUME, H.R. Doc. No. 9-2-64, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. Part 8, 27-28 (March 10, 1971).
If financial and other information about CDC activities were available there are
several persons in urban underdeveloped communities who might perform a type of
"brokerage" function if that function is defined as interpreting and disseminating the
information contained in the CDC's statement. Ministers, social workers, and staff
directors of other social welfare organizations are among those who might perform this
function.
159. See note 152 supra.
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would not otherwise be taken into account." The incentives to join
in the pursuit of collective benefits are generally weaker than the
impetus to oppose specific actions that are perceived as
detrimental.' It requires time, peer group interaction, and publicity
to mobilize latent interests. Not all, if any, of those resources are
likely to be available to a majority of ghetto residents. Allowing
ghetto residents to participate in corporate decisions would give
disorganized interests a chance to congeal, and would reduce
somewhat the cost of public participation in institutional decisions.
CDCs cannot implement Subpart VII or adequately respond to
ghetto conditions if they are patterened upon one model or commit-
ted to a single approach to issues. By bringing fresh influences into
CDC decision-making, the de facto shareholder proposal can reduce
the risk that CDC officials will be bound by belief in a particular
construct. The resulting policy decisions might not always be sound,
but they would not all suffer from the same set of assumptions.
The de facto shareholder proposal would also have the effect of
generating relevant information about specific decisions and
diminishing the need to rely on abstractions. For example, the size-
density quandry could be addressed by establishing one CDC in each
ghetto area and waiting to see if its operations would be severely
encumbered by legal opposition. A debilitating number of lawsuits
would suggest that the area includes more communities of interest
than a single corporation can serve. The area could then be divided,
or another CDC could be established. A second corporation could
compete with the first, operate as a subsidiary, or take over a
specific assignment, depending upon the substantive sources of the
controversies.
Similarly, the appropriate level of federal intervention in CDC
activities would be a function of the effectiveness of the de facto
shareholder proposal in revealing and correcting defects in decision-
making. A fully functional de facto shareholder system would large-
ly cancel out causes of federal intervention related to the adequacy
of participation or differing estimates of community concerns. Fur-
ther, being subject to lawsuits by residents might deter government
officials from arbitrary exercises of power, and prompt ad-
160. See, e.g., Medical Committee for Human Rights v. Securities and Ex-
change Comm'n., 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Securities and Exchange Comm'n v.
Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947).
161. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 60-61 (1971).
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ministrators to articulate standards for their decisions."2 Giving
ghetto residents the power to exercise control over CDCs would
also enhance the local legitimacy of CDCs since the de facto.
shareholders would not have to accept as an article of faith that the
corporation operates in their best interests.
In summary, accepting the view that the decision-making ar-
rangement established by Subpart VII only makes sense if it is
perceived as a format for conflict resolution leads to the conclusion
that the application of corporate law principles by Congress, the
courts, and the CSA is necessary if CDCs are to be effective in ac-
complishing their objectives. There is no way to establish une-
quivocally the need for the proposed congressional amendment, ex-
cept insofar as it is important to attempt to bridge the gap between
the poor and the non-poor. Translating Subpart VII into a program
for social change which is decent, conscionable, and tolerable,
regardless of whether changes occur, would be a beginning.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the following concluding paragraphs is to ex-
pand upon the previous assertion that the approach to under-
development illustrated by Subpart VII is inadequate as a response
to poverty, in the present, and particularly in the future.
Since it is legal analysis which has generated the conclusion
embodied in the stated assertion, it is necessary to recognize the
relevance of legal standards and customs to essentially economic ac-
tivities. If programs such as Subpart VII do not conceptually belong
in a legal or corporate context, then the conclusions legal analysis
can reach are likely to be misguided.
Legal analysis has a peculiar capacity to address the present as
more than an episode in time; it is a method of viewing current ex-
perience as an aspect of custom or tradition and in light of what is
of shared importance. Consequently, legal analysis can disclose the
effect of current activities upon social continuity; what is pursued or
obtained can be measured against what is given up. Thus, the kind
of recognition available through legal analysis is indispensable in
assessing the social costs of anti-poverty activities.
The factual issues are, then, whether the difference between
developed and underdeveloped areas is of a kind or degree that
162. See, e.g., Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1183 (1973).
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makes irrelevant the social experience expressed as legal
precedents, and whether in any event it can be eliminated readily
enough to moot the question. The answer to the latter question ap-
pears to be no, but the first question probably cannot be definitely
answered by one person for another. However, although it is possi-
ble to conclude that the differences between underdeveloped and
developed areas justify a dramatically different approach to poverty
than has been applied to other problems, the assumptions underly-
ing that conclusion are subject to several objections. Indeed, they
might be termed unacceptable if it is agreed that it makes a signifi-
cant difference whether the residents of underdeveloped areas are
assigned, for development purposes, a different system of standards
and values than that which applies in other areas. That is, it will be
presumed that what is important is not only what happens to the
poor under anti-poverty programs, but what the larger society does
to itself in the process.
At this point it should be evident that the issue of whether
legal analysis is an appropriate approach to economic development
programs is very close, conceptually, to the issue of whether such
programs would in practice profit from an infusion of legal stan-
dards and procedures. The two issues do actually collapse into one
another at a certain level of analysis. The following paragraphs at-
tempt to sustain such an analysis, and to provide a kind of reorienta-
tion toward poverty and the present, rooted in revised assumptions
about the problem.
The assumptions that appear to discredit an extralegal ap-
proach to poverty culminate in a failure to recognize that it is am-
bivalence toward the asserted objectives and less certain results of
anti-poverty activities that structure our efforts. It is precisely this
ambivalence that is given legal effect when CDCs are viewed as
substantive conflict-resolving institutions rather than simple
vehicles for the delivery of resources to underdeveloped areas.
There is, therefore, a need to add a jurisprudential dimension to
development programs.
A summary of the assumptions that must be overcome before
current development activities can proceed to address the present
must be preceded by a reminder that the preceding section of the
article proposed measures that would have two limited effects.
163. It should be noted that the prevailing and proposed approaches to poverty
under consideration here are precisely those delineated as alternative interpretations
of Corrugated Container. See text supra at 64-71.
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First, the internal procedures of CDCs would be formalized; second,
the standards imposed upon CDC decision-making would confer stand-
ing rights upon area residents, enabling them to challenge some
CDC decisions or perhaps to bring suit on behalf of the corporations
on some occasions. Nothing in the preceding material is intended to
recommend any particular outcome for actions that might be in-
itiated under the statute. Thus the social or political decency toward
the poor which is one of the principal concerns of this article does
not depend upon the substantive results of the proposed measures.
Perhaps the following paragraphs summarizing the challenged
assumptions will help to elucidate the sense in which decency is an
issue in efforts to overcome underdevelopment.
Programs such as the one established by Subpart VII seem to
presume that in a context of overwhelming and comprehensive need,
the possibility of conflicts between individual interests and collec-
tive or community goals can be disregarded. However, the need for
a decision-making format that accommodates divergent interests
would seem more acute when comprehensive needs have generated
a statutory design of the scope and ambition of Subpart VII. It is
possible that the "collective good" is more evident in
underdeveloped areas and can to some extent be defined by
reference to objective standards, without the assistance of market
mechanisms or a genuine political system. However, it would seem
that the perceptions of the area residents who are the subject of
development programs are important regardless of whether they
comport with objective, rational conclusions. The opinions and sen-
timents of the non-poor are generally recognized even when they do
not meet an accepted standard of logic. Any attempt to make deci-
sions on behalf of others that ascribes to the others an inhuman ra-
tionality in identifying their own best interests is inhumane.
Without channels for participation by the poor an acceptable degree
of responsiveness to the needs which are in fact felt can probably
not be achieved.
Subpart VII furnishes a concrete example of these difficulties.
The control acquired by the government over CDC activities effec-
tively replaced the original constituencies of CDCs with larger na-
tional constituencies. The degree of power held by non-residents
over residents' lives may be defensible on the basis of the original
bargain, but it is also embarrassing from a democratic standpoint. In
that sense, the power can only be justified to the extent that its ex-
ercise is governed by standards.
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The next assumption which needs to be overcome is somewhat
subsidiary to the first and involves an apparent indifference to the
distinctions that a development program makes between the poor
and non-poor in the process of attacking poverty. However, it is sub-
mitted that poverty cannot be the operative standard in develop-
ment efforts. It is precisely the difference between the poor and the
non-poor, rather than poverty per se which is objectionable and that
implies standards for development efforts. Assuming that poverty
itself is the problem licenses a level of indifference to the poor that
creates another difference and additional distance between
historically advantaged and disadvantaged people. In this regard, it
is again essential that the poor are viewed as participants in the
development process. Residents of underdeveloped areas are as a
rule incapable of escaping the condition of poverty and equally im-
mobile with regard to the effects of anti-poverty strategies. Since
their status as participants is axiomatic, it should be formalized and
given substance.
The final assumption consists of misconceptions concerning
development itself. The utility of the term "development" in discus-
sions of domestic poverty is due in part to its capacity to disguise
what is being discussed. The term can appear to refer to a substan-
tive goal or to the process of overcoming underdevelopment.
However, it is impossible to give "development" a very concrete
substantive meaning without proceeding to plan the future, perhaps
on the basis of personality or ideology.
Abandoning the goal of development and embracing the pro-
cess has the effect of turning attention away from assumptions and
toward some difficulties attached to development that are otherwise
easy to overlook. It is precisely these difficulties that need to be
taken into account in development programs. That is, the process of
overcoming underdevelopment consists of social change. The concept
of social change conjures up fears and uncertainties that the seem-
ingly safer and more predictable "development" process appears to
bypass. However, it is precisely such fears and uncertainties that
are relevant to the question of who should control the development
process. For instance, Subpart VII appears to be based upon the
assumption that development is a kind of "cheerful engineering"
that can be confined to designated areas. However, the basis for
granting non-residents influence over the course of development is
that the effects of activities undertaken upon the authority of Sub-
part VII cannot be confined to specific areas nor completely
predicted. In this regard, it is especially significant that if develop-
19781 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 85
ment had occurred with all deliberate speed, the historical position
of racial minorities in America would be drastically different.
Viewing development as social change also makes it more dif-
ficult to suppose that an appropriate and effective technology can be
designed, for social change is no easier to plan in advance and con-
trol than it is to allow in the first place.
If the preceding observations accurately depict the position that
we are in with regard to poverty, then it is apparent that "develop-
ment" is at once necessary and in a sense impossible, and that the
very nature of development creates precisely the circumstances that
have been described as the classic role of the courts in a democratic
society. Thus underdevelopment in the context of the American
system creates a paradigmatic need for the resource known as the
common law approach to decision-making. The need is not entirely
or even primarily a need of the poor; in large part, it consists of a
national need to act in a manner that implicitly recognizes and
honors the principles that define the relationship between the poor
and non-poor as members and citizens of the same social system.
That is, this article has delineated a difference between developing
impoverished areas and integrating the poor into the larger social
system. It has been argued that, on a legal level, anti-poverty efforts
should be aligned to the later objective. It is conceded that the pro-
posal may make little concrete difference to the poor. However, the
difference that it would make, in a society that must somehow in-
clude poor and non-poor on equal terms, is that it would allow that
society to retain, if not to implement, the decency of its anti-poverty
impulses.
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